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Anatomy of an Affirmative Duty to Protect:
42 U.S.C. Section 1986
Linda E. Fisher*
L Introduction
A small pack of white thugs storms into a small town on Harley-
Davidsons on a hot midsummer evening, intent on ridding the town of the
young African-Americans who have been congregating on the town square
that summer. Joined by a swarm of hundreds of angry townspeople, the
vigilantes scream racial epithets and threats at the interlopers ("Get the
n____," 'rN___, get out of town," et cetera). They are particularly enraged at
the relationships that have developed between the young black men and local
white women. The mob chases and attacks the black youths and their white
friends, finally driving them out of the square after several terrifying hours.
Only a few police officers are on the scene. They stand by idly, despite town
officials' advance knowledge of the impending confrontation.
The violence continues the next night. The mob is unrestrained despite
an onslaught of racially charged threats and assaults. An exchange of rocks
and bottles ensues between the factions. The police finally intervene. They
arrest the entire interracial group, rather than their attackers, on disorderly
conduct charges notwithstanding a complete lack of evidence of individual
guilt (the charges are later dismissed on appeal). Nearby, the mob blocks,
threatens ("Kill the n . Get the f ing n___ out of town before we kill
them."), and descends upon two black men and two white women attempting
to enter a car and drive away. Police drag off and arrest the four occupants of
the car, ignoring the mob. Elsewhere in town, a crowd hurls threats at an
interracial couple sitting quietly in their home. The police only urge the
couple to move out of town.
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This scene occurred neither in the 1800s, nor in the South in an early
decade of this century, but in the town of Hanover, Pennsylvania during July
of 1991, only a few months after videotapes of the Rodney King beating were
nationally televised.' The event, however, is eerily reminiscent of the much
earlier Reconstruction era when the Ku Klux Klan and local white militia
groups similarly intimidated the newly freed slaves from exercising their
democratic rights.2 The historical markers dotting the Hanover area, located
six miles north of the Mason-Dixon line and ten miles from Gettysburg, are
poignant reminders that the Civil War and Reconstruction era reforms never
accomplished their goal of preventing and deterring racist violence.
While the interracial group members in this case clearly had legal claims
against the white bikers who instigated the riot,3 the nonresponsiveness of the
police is to me the most shocking aspect of the story. Their liability, however,
is less than apparent, because the police did not join directly in any racist
activity, and because the crux of their dereliction was a failure to protect the
riot's victims Tort law does not normally impose a duty to protect,5 nor do
the police ordinarily have a duty to render assistance to any particular member
of the public.6
The interracial youth group probably would have no legal recourse
against the police were it not for the 1871 Civil Rights Act, also denominated
the Ku Klux Klan Act (Act), which Congress passed to address similar
conduct.7 The Act includes provisions now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985
and 1986 that provide a cause of action against both perpetrators of class-
based conspiracies and individuals who fail to protect victims of such conspir-
1. This is a synopsis of the facts of Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1293-94 (3d Cir.
1994), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 115-25. It is interesting to note that the riot
occurred only months after the national broadcast of the videotape of the Rodney King beating.
See King v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F.3d 842, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1996).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 47-51 (discussing violence of the Reconstruction
era).
3. The interracial group members based their claims on 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1994). See
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 2, Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290 (3d Cir. 1994)
(No. 1 :CV-92-0595) (on file with the author).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 115-16 (discussing facts of Clabaugh).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 255-58 (discussing tort law regarding duty to
protect).
6. Under the common-law tort doctrine of public duty, state actors owe a duty only to
the public at large, rather than to any particular individual. See, e.g., Doe v. Calumet City, 641
N.E.2d 498, 503-05 (II. 1994) (stating mother had no negligence claim against municipality
or officer for failure to protect minor children from rapist who broke into family's apartment,
despite officer's knowledge of events).
7. See Ku Klux Klan Act, 17 Stat. 13-15 (1871); MARY FRANCES BERRY, BLACK
RESISTANCE, WHITE LAW: A HISTORY OF CONSTrrTUONAL RACISM IN AMERICA 79 (1994)
(noting that Congress passed Ku Klux Klan Act in response to Ku Klux Klan violence).
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acies.s Section 1986 claims are important tools for civil rights litigators
attempting to deter and punish racial violence. Unfortunately, however, few
civil rights litigators are aware of the statute's existence and its utility in
fighting racist conspiracies.
Section 1986, the subject of this Article, imposes perhaps the strongest
affirmative duty of any piece of legislation arising from the Civil War. It
demonstrates the extent to which Congress reached, pursuant to the enforce-
ment clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to attempt to eradicate Ku Klux
Klan violence during Reconstruction.9 Section 1986 imposes a "Good Samar-
itan" duty to protect upon police, bystanders, or others who have knowledge
of impending execution of a racist conspiracy as defined by § 1985 of the
Act"0 and have the ability to prevent the conspirators from carrying out their
objectives. Section 1986 provides:
8. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986 (1994) (legislation derived from 1871 Act).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 56-62 (discussing enactment of § 1986).
10. Section 1985, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
(1) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or
place of confidence underthe United States, or from discharging any duties thereof;
or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave any State,
district, or place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to
injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge ofthe duties
of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his
property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his
official duties;
(2) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from
attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully,
and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on
account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, present-
ment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such
juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indict-
ment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if
two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing,
or defeating, in any manner, the due course ofjustice in any State or Territory, with
intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his
property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person,
or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;
(3) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from
giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection
of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or
threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or
advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully
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Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to
be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be com-
mitted, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission
of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be commit-
ted, shall be liable to the party injured... for all damages caused by such
wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have pre-
vented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case."
Thus, knowledge of a § 1985 conspiracy, power to protect its victims,
and neglect or refusal to protect results in liability under § 1986. Section 1986
reaches more broadly than § 1985, its predicate, by inculpating bystander
defendants who are not themselves conspirators under § 1985. It is unique
among American civil rights statutes in creating liability when a defendant has
neither personally committed a discriminatory act, engaged in a conspiracy to
do so, nor acted with discriminatory intent. A negligent failure to protect by
an actor with knowledge of a § 1985 conspiracy and power to protect its
victims is actionable.12 The statute creates a legal duty. In effect, it "depu-
tizes" local actors in a position to intervene in prohibited conspiracies and
renders them liable to victims of conspiratorial violence, thus focusing on
those in the best position to stop the violence. As a result, § 1986 extends the
reach of liability beyond the immediate circle of conspirators and thus but-
tresses § 1985, which attaches liability only to those who affirmatively enter
into the conspiracy.'3
The statute's duty to protect is instrumental in confronting a particularly
serious evil - racist conspiracies - that cannot be adequately addressed by
other means. The harms of racism remain serious. Racist conspiracies and
other hate crimes continue to be committed, demonstrating the ongoing need
for the remedies of§ 1986." Congress enacted § 1986 as a response to the Ku
qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of
Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on
account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this
section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his
person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action
for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985.
I1. Id. § 1986.
12. See Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1298 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that negligence
is sufficient to maintain § 1986 claim).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
14. The Department ofJustice's hate crime statistics for 1996 reveal that 8759 hate crimes
were reported to the FBI during that year- 5396 of these crimes were motivated by racial bias.
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Klux Klan violence of the Reconstruction erawhen the foundations of the Civil
War victory were being undermined." Although our current circumstances of
racial rivalry, discontent, and social alienation are generally less egregious and
blatant than those during Reconstruction, the remedies of § 1986 are still
needed. The persistence ofracial hatred and discrimination, as documented by
hate crime statistics, confirms that ongoing need. 6 Section 1986 is thus avital,
but underused, weapon in the battle against racist conspiracies.
Moreover, § 1986 has significance beyond its immediate application, as
it sheds light on the proper reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The strongly
affirmative provisions of § 1986, in conjunction with its passage under the
authority of the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only three
years after adoption of that amendment in 1868," indicate that the
Reconstruction-era Forty-Second Congress construed the scope of its enforce-
ment powers very broadly. 9 In turn, this virtually contemporaneous congres-
sional understanding that enforcement ofthe Constitution can call for vigorous,
affmnative governmental action to safeguard constitutional rights corroborates
what Robin West has called the "abolitionist interpretation" of the Fourteenth
See CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, HATE CRIM STATISTICS 1996 § 1, at 5. In 1995, 7947 hate crimes
were reported. See id.; see also Cause for Concern: Hate Crimes in America (Leadership
Conf. Educ. Fund/Leadership Conf. on Civil Rights, Wash., D.C.) Jan. 1997, at 7-10 (giving
examples of hate crimes committed upon African-Americans); The Year in Hate, Intelligence
Report (Intelligence Proj. of the Southern Poverty Law Ctr., Montgomery, Ala.) Winter 1998,
at 6 (indicating that number of hate groups rose significantly in 1997).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 47-62 (discussing Reconstruction-era violence as
impetus for enactment of§ 1986).
16. See, e.g., Berhanu v. Metzgar, 850 P.2d 373,376 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (upholdingjury
verdict against defendants in case involving murder of black Ethiopian by members of White
Aryan Resistance). The recent, tragic, racially motivated killing of a black man in Jasper, Texas
by three white men who chained him to the back of a pickup truck and dragged him, dismem-
bering his body, provides another example. Death Penaltyfor 3 Weighed/Dragging Murder
Horrifies Nation, NEWSDAY, June 11, 1998, at A23, available in 1998 WL 2673606.
17. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows:
Section I: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws....
Section V: The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
18. See WILLIAME.NELSON,THEFOURTEENTHAMENDMENT: FROMPOLMCALPRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DoCTRNE 60 (1988) (referencing date of ratification of Fourteenth Amendment).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 52-62.
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Amendment." Drawing on the earlier work of Jacobus tenBroek and other
legal historians,2" West has concluded that a proper interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause, in particular, focuses as much on the concept of affirmative
governmental protection as on that of equality.' Other commentators have
embraced similar understandings.' In other words, government is required not
only to treat citizens equally, but to accord them protection from threats of
private violence and other private violations of law that undermine equality.24
A failure to provide equal protection can arise as easily from inaction as from
action: a failure to rescue or protect an aggrieved citizen from racist violence
can also constitute a failure to provide equal protection.'
The Equal Protection Clause is therefore not merely a mandate to provide
government services in a colorblind manner if government chooses to provide
them at all, as many now believe.26 According to West and other scholars, the
Equal Protection Clause is also an affirmative obligation to ensure that citi-
zens are protected from private violence, denial of the right to contract, and
the like, that would deny them their status as free, equal persons.27 TenBroek
posited an essentially similar and overlapping contemporary interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.28 In sum, according to this
20. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVECONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOUR-
TEENTHAMENDMENT 9-44 (1994) (discussing abolitionist interpretation of Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
21. See generally JACOBUSTENBROEK, THEANTISLAVERYORIGINS OFTHEFOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1951), reprinted in EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965) (discussing antislavery origins
of Fourteenth Amendment); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding
of"Equal Protection of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421 (1972) (suggesting Fourteenth
Amendment must be read against its historical background).
22. See WEST, supra note 20, at 23-25 (noting that denial of state protection to one group
of its citizens leaves those citizens profoundly unequal).
23. For instance, Steven Heyman and Eric Schnapper also have endorsed the view that
the Fourteenth Amendment provided strong affirmative authority to Congress to protect blacks
by means of race-conscious programs such as the Freedmen's Bureau Acts. See Steven J. Hey-
man, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41
DuKEL.J. 507,546 (1991) (suggesting central purpose of Fourteenth Amendment was to estab-
lish right to protection as part of federal constitution); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and
the Legislative History ofthe FourteenthAmendment, 71 VA. L.REv. 753,754 (1985) (discuss-
ing race-conscious reconstruction programs enacted concurrently with Fourteenth Amendment).
24. See WEST, supra note 20, at 24-25 (arguing that protection from unchecked violence
was necessary to eradicate slavery).
25. See id. at 33-34 (suggesting that state can breach its duty to protect through action or
inaction).
26. See id. at 9-16 (discussing modem equal protection scholarship and jurisprudence).
27. See supra notes 22-25.
28. TENBROE, supra note 21, at 206-07, 222-23 (detailing similar nature and construc-
tion of Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause).
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broad interpretation, enforcement of the Constitution can, in some circum-
stances, require governmental protection and prohibit governmental inaction.
The scope of required action can exceed the bounds normally acceptable in
the common law if necessary to remediate the grievous harms of racism, and,
more narrowly, even if the Constitution does not mandate affirmative protec-
tion in certain circumstances, statutorily created protection duties may still be
constitutional enforcement mechanisms.29
I do not claim in this Article that the abolitionist interpretation is the only
correct reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. My claim is narrower: The
Forty-Second Congress's understanding of its Fourteenth Amendment-based
enforcement powers has value for our current understanding of the Amend-
ment and requires further attention. In this regard, the abolitionist interpreta-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment and the affirmative obligations of § 1986
contrast sharply with the extremely limited view of the reach of constitutional
rights and duties currently proclaimed, even trumpeted, by many courts and
commentators. 0 According to this view, the Constitution is a "charter of
negative liberties," the function of which is to restrain behavior only when it
fundamentally interferes with the autonomous exercise of liberty by others.3
Correlatively, few affirmative duties are imposed on either government or
individuals under constitutional law. Thus, governmental or private inaction,
even in the face of longstanding injustices or tragedies that the actor has the
power to prevent, invokes no legal duty to act.32
Accordingly, under this limited view, government has no constitutional
duty to rescue or protect individuals from harms perpetrated by third parties
in the absence of a special relationship (often limited to custodial relation-
29. See infra text accompanying notes 178-93.
30. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS in THE MODERN STATE 41,47-50 (Geoffrey Stone et al. eds., 1992) (suggesting
theme of distrust of government is fundamental to our constitutional structure).
31. See, e.g., Jackson v. Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). The court in
Jackson stated:
IT]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties. The
men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too
little for the people but that it might do too much to them. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, adopted in 1868 at the height of laissez-faire thinking, sought to protect
Americans from oppression by state government, not to secure them basic govern-
mental services. Of course, even in the laissez-faire era only anarchists thought the
state should not provide [police services] .... But no one thought federal consti-
tutional guarantees or federal tort remedies necessary to prod the states to provide
the services that everyone wanted provided. The concern was that some states
might provide those services to all but blacks, and the equal protection clause
prevents that kind of discrimination.
Id. (citations omitted).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 259-61, 267-68.
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ships) or in the narrowly circumscribed category of dangers created by the
state.33 A particularly distressing example of the limited reach of government
duty is the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services.34 In DeShaney, the Court held that the Due
Process Clause imposed no duty on child welfare caseworkers to protect a
four-year-old boy subjected to ongoing physical abuse by his father despite
the continuing involvement of the child welfare system in supervising the
father's custody and caseworkers' knowledge of the continuing pattern of
abuse.35 This decision provoked a flurry of commentary, much of it highly
critical of the Court's cramped view of constitutional duty under the Four-
teenth Amendment.36 Commentators have presented persuasive arguments
undermining the limited view that refuses to recognize more than the narrow-
est constitutional duty to protect against the misconduct of others.37 Nonethe-
less, the individualistic, libertarian view continues to predominate.38 How-
ever, the abolitionist interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as
the history of§ 1986 undermine the restrictive view of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by providing evidence supporting an alternative interpretation that con-
ceives of broader governmental protective duties.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 259-61, 267-68.
34. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
35. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192-94
(1989) (affirming lower court's holding that there was no actionable § 1983 claim); accord
Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 117 (1992) (holding that § 1983 does not apply where
municipal employee was fatally injured because of city's alleged failure to train its employees);
Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056,1058 (lst Cir. 1997) (finding police officers' qualified immunity
defeated plaintif s due process claim where police failed to follow up on report of abuse and
where abuser subsequently killed plaintiff's children).
36. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV.
2271, 2278-2308 (1990) (criticizing Court's failure to articulate coherent principle to apply to
cases like DeShaney); Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" of
DeShaney, 57 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 1513, 1514 (1989) (characterizing majority's opinion in
DeShaney as illogical, insensitive, and wrong); David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government
Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 53, 56-71 (discussing inadequacies of
theoretical approach that Court used in DeShaney); Benjamin Zirpursky, Note, DeShaney and
the Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1101, 1102-03 (1990) (suggesting major-
ity's sterile methodology prevented Court from reaching proper decision in DeShaney).
37. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 36, at 2278-79 (undermining highly rigid distinctions
underlying conventional wisdom about governmental duties); Heyman, supra note 23, at 509-12
(suggesting original understanding of Fourteenth Amendment encompassed more than courts
have recognized).
38. Even post-DeShaney, however, federal courts have determined that certain instances
of governmental inaction violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For
instance, if a state actor refuses to rescue a potential drowning victim and refuses to allow others
to aid in the rescue, courts may find a constitutional duty. See Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d
1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding plaintiff sufficiently alleged that county arbitrarily denied
Fourteenth Amendment right to life); see also infra notes 259-60.
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In addition, the evidence supporting a broader interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause in particular, casts
doubt on the Supreme Court's narrow, constrained position on affirmative
action, most recently expressed in Adarand v. Pena.39 Under Adarand,
affirmative action efforts are constitutional only when narrowly tailored to
remedy specific past acts of discrimination occurring within the jurisdiction
of the party responsible for the program.4" No affirmative action plan may
correct racial imbalances occasioned by broader societal discrimination.4' In
otherwords, notwithstanding our long history of blatant discrimination against
racial minorities and its continuing legacy reflected in the inferior opportuni-
ties available to most minority group members, the Supreme Court's current
position holds affirmative action programs constitutional in only the narrowest
of circumstances. Those proposing an affirmative action plan must them-
selves have been involved in past discrimination before the remedy of race
conscious affirmative action is permissible. In contrast, a more affirmative
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause suggests a broader and more
effective remedy, which would focus primarily on the need to protect victims
of discrimination who have been denied the ability to earn a livelihood.42
Moreover, the remedies of§ 1986, which I will demonstrate are a consti-
tutional exercise of Congress's enforcement power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment,43 also stand in opposition to the Court's constrained
interpretation of permissible affirmative action under the Equal Protection
Clause. Section 1986 requires that protection be provided by those able to
assist victims of racist conspiracies regardless of their status as causal agents
or their individual intent. It reflects a Reconstruction-era understanding that
the evils caused by racial discrimination may require the government, under
the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment, to take affirmative actions to
combat private discrimination in circumstances that would not otherwise
require the intervention. In order to provide effective protection for aggrieved
victims, those outside the immediate circle of direct causation may be drawn
into corrective action. Without such affirmative protection, victims would not
receive protection equivalent to that afforded the relatively more privileged,
who remain free from such violent intrusions into their lives.
39. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
40. See Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,220-22 (1995) (summarizing Court's precedent).
41. See id. ("Societal discrimination, without more, istoo amorphous abasis for imposing
aracially classified remedy." (citing Wygantv. JacksonBd. ofEduc.,476U.S.267, 276 (1986))).
42. See WEST, supranote20, at 37-38 (suggesting protectionist approach is more permis-
sive of affirmative action than formal approach). Notwithstanding this broad mandate, certain
restraints are necessary to ensure that the remedy remains within constitutional bounds and that
it does not unduly burden the innocent. See infra text accompanying notes 273, 278.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 203-23.
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This is the first law review article to address, discuss, and evaluate § 1986
in depth. Despite its strong, affirmative remedy and the continuing need for
its application, civil rights litigators are not generally familiar with the statute
and few reported opinions discuss it. Even fewer reported opinions have
granted relief under § 1986." Part of my purpose in writing this Article is to
bring the statute to the foreground, examine its workings, and catch the atten-
tion of those working within the legal system to remedy civil rights violations.
I also hope to begin to explore the implications of § 1986 for our understanding
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the government's affirmative duty to protect
those subjected to racial discrimination - even discrimination perpetrated by
private actors. This Article does not fully develop the constitutional ramifica-
tions of§ 1986. Rather, the intent ofthis Article isto suggest fruitful areas for
further research and to highlight evidence undermining the Supreme Court's
current restrictive view of Fourteenth Amendment rights.
In this Article, I first explicate the scope and purposes of section § 1986
by examining its text and history. In light of these purposes, I next examine
justifications for the broad reach of § 1986, focusing primarily on prevention
of extreme harm as justifying the section's extension of liability to new
defendants. I continue by arguing that the statute is both effective and effi-
cient because it renders liable those whose knowledge of the underlying
conspiracy puts them in the optimal position to prevent it. I include discus-
sion of the few cases in which successful § 1986 claims have been brought,
as well as some cases in which § 1986 claims should have been raised. I focus
particularly on the obligations of public officials under § 1986 because their
liability has the greatest significance for prevention and deterrence of racist
conspiracies. I discuss the liability of private bystanders as well, but my focus
in those instances is on the officials of private organizations such as the Ku
Klux Klan. As official representatives of an organization, they bear a height-
ened responsibility for the conduct of members, arising in part from their
ability to engage in effective preventive measures.
I continue by examining the constitutionality of §§ 1985 and 1986 in
light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in City ofBoerne v. Flores," in
which the Court narrowly construed the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's
enforcement clause." Finally, I discuss the potential implications of § 1986
for interpretation of the duty to protect and affirmative action programs under
the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment and conclude that the constitu-
tional authority for affirmative obligations to rescue is stronger than many
believe and demands further study. Unearthing authority for a vigorous duty
44. See infra text accompanying notes 114-202.
45. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
46. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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to protect is an important project with implications for many critical constitu-
tional and political issues.
I. Historical Background
Sections 1985 and 1986 were enacted in 1871, as part of the Civil Rights
Act, which also contained the more commonly construed § 1983. The Act
was passed against the backdrop of brutal and pervasive Klan violence in the
South.47 Subsequent to the Civil War, Reconstruction represented an attempt
on the part of the North to realign relationships between the races in the South
and to give African-Americans the right and ability to participate fully in
economic and civic life. Most of the Southern states fought back by enacting
so-called Black Codes that attempted to reimpose many of the burdens of
slavery on free blacks.48 Unrepentant Southerners also harassed and intimi-
dated white supporters of black rights.49 The struggle intensified after Con-
gress adopted the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868:
By 1870, the Ku Klux Klan and kindred organizations ... had become
deeply entrenched in nearly every Southern state. One should not think of
the Klan, even in its heyday, as possessing a well-organized structure or
47. See BERRY, supra note 7, at 78-79 (suggesting that Civil Rights Act was Congress's
response to reports of violence).
48. In response, Congress first passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which included the
provisions now codified at42U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, aswell as more controversial provisions
for federal prosecution of certain racially motivated crimes. See Thompson v. New York, 487
F. Supp. 212,218-19 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (detailing history and purpose of 1866 Civil Rights Act);
William Cohen, Negro InvoluntaryServitude intheSouth, 1865-1940: A PreliminaryAnalysis,
in BLACK SOUTHERNERS ANDTHE LAW, 1865-1900, at 35,38-39 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1994)
(discussing rise of Black Codes and corresponding Reconstruction efforts to void them).
49. See NELSON, supra note 18, at 42. Nelson stated:
Southern intransigence also took the form of denying freedom of speech to those
who attacked Southern ways. As another of Sherman's correspondents wrote, it
was "notorious" that "Northern men have been subjected to the Gun knife thepistol
the rope & tar & feathers for opinion sake all over the South" and that such perse-
cution would prevent "employment" of"[a] multitude of people" in "teaching and
preaching in the South." Representative Butler observed that a Southerner "knows
that he can go to any part of the North and speak his sentiments freely," whereas
Northerners could not go South and "argue the principles of free government with-
out fear of the knife or pistol, or of being murdered by a mob."
Id. (alterations in original); see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights and the FourteenthAmend-
ment, 101 YALEL.L 1193, 1217 (1992) ("As with the slavery system itself, the [Black Codes]
would invariably require systematic state abridgements of the core rights and freedoms in the
Bill of Rights. These abridgements would of course hit blacks the hardest, but the resurrection
of a caste system would also require repression of any whites who might question the codes or
harbor sympathy for blacks."). Amar's arguments in his article have been further elaborated in
hisnewbook, The Bill ofRights. See generallyAKi REEDAmAR, THE BILLoFRIGHTS (1998).
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clearly defined regional leadership. Acts of violence were generally
committed by local groups on their own initiative. But the unity of purpose
and common tactics of these local organizations makes it possible to
generalize about their goals and impact, and the challenge they posed to the
survival ofReconstruction. In effect, the Klan was a military force serving
the interests of the Democratic party, the planter class, and all those who
desired the restoration ofwhite supremacy. Its purposes were political, but
political in the broadest sense, for it sought to affect power relations, both
public and private, throughout Southern society. It aimed to reverse the
interlocking changes sweeping over the South during Reconstruction: to
destroy the Republican party's infrastructure, undermine the Reconstruc-
tion state, reestablish control of the black labor force, and restore racial
subordination in every aspect of Southern life. 0
Klan members' attacks focused in particular on leaders of the African-Amer-
ican community, blacks in general, white Republicans, and federal agents."
Faced with such a disturbing level of violence confronting the fragile
national unity achieved by the Union in the Civil War, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 pursuant to the enforcement authority granted it by
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.52 Section 1 of that Act, now codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conferred a private right of action on victims of constitu-
tional or other deprivations of federal law and was passed with little debate
and no amendment.53
50. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877,
at 425-26 (1988); see John Witt, Book Note, The Klan on Trial, 106 YALE L.J. 1611, 1612
(1997) (discussing reign of terror that Ku Klux Klan initiated).
51. BERRY, supra note 7, at 78-79 (noting Ku Klux Klan's clashes with state militia units
that included both whites and blacks); FONER, supra note 50, at 426-30 (discussing violence
of Klansmen).
52. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664-89 (1978) (recounting
legislative history of Civil Rights Act of 1871); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170 (1961)
(same), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
The Supreme Court later found authority for § 1985 of the Civil Rights Act (and presum-
ably § 1986 as well, because it is ancillary to § 1985) in the Thirteenth Amendment and its
enforcement clause. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1971); see also Red Elk
v. Vig, 571 F. Supp. 422,425 (D.S.D. 1983) (discussing Griffin). The Thirteenth Amendment
outlaws slavery: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to theirjurisdiction." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. It also specifies in § 2 that
"Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Id § 2.
53. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978) (discussing
legislative history of Act). Section 1983 reads in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within thejurisdiction
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The provisions of § 1985 were derived from Section 2 of the 1871 Act,
and create a cause of action based on a conspiracy which deprives one of
access to justice or equal protection of law.
The debates surrounding the passage of the Act expressed concern that
conspiratorial and unlawful acts ofthe Klan wentunpunishedbecause Klan
members and sympathizers controlled or influenced the administration of
state criminaljustice. Section 2 was designed to provide civil and criminal
remedies in federal court for such conspiratorial activities.'
The criminal penalties of this and related sections proved very controversial.5
Like § 1985, the provision now codified as § 1986 also evolved along a
tortuous path. The inaction of state and local governments and the local
citizenry in the face of Klan-instigated beatings and murders was a major
concern of supporters of the legislation. Police passivity despite apparent
prior knowledge of these crimes was particularly troublesome, as it evidenced
tacit involvement of local authorities in the violence.16 Section 1986 ad-
dressed that concern by extending liability beyond the immediate perpetrators
of the violence. The section as ultimately passed, however, was considerably
narrower than the version originally proposed.
SenatorJohn Sherman, the Senate sponsorofthe bill, soughtto amendthe
bill that had passed the House and had been introduced in the Senate to impose
liability on any inhabitant of a municipality "for damage inflicted by persons
'riotously and tumultuously assembled."' 57 The purpose of the amendment,
according to Sherman, was to provide an incentive for property owners to aid
in the enforcement of civil rights laws by putting their property at stake.
Similar statutes, he explained, existed in England, as well as in a number of
states.5
The amendment passed the Senate, but the House, refusing to acquiesce,
required submission to a conference committee. The first conference commit-
tee draft provided for a similar action, but only against a local governmental
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the person injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
54. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1233 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Briscoe v.
LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)).
55. In fact, the Supreme Court struck down the criminal counterpart to § 1985 in United
States v. Harris. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 644 (1882).
56. See Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864, 870 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (citing Marshall Shapo,
Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape andthe Frontiers Beyond, 60 N.W. L. REV. 277,279-82
(1966)).
57. Monell, 436 U.S. at 666.
58. Id. at 667.
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 461 (1999)
entity, and only in the event that ajudgment was not satisfied against individ-
ual defendants responsible for the violence.59 The House rejected the first
conference substitute and called a second conference. That conference
committee rejected municipal liability and drafted the statutory language later
codified as § 1986.60 Although Congress rejected imposition of municipal
liability, its intent in drafting and passing the section was to provide broad,
effective protection to victims of racist conspiracies.61 The focus of the
conference committee's revision of the Sherman amendment and the ensuing
debates was the need to compel protective action from local citizens and
municipalities.62 The statute as passed accomplishes that objective.
III. Elements and Scope of§ 1985 and § 1986
To set forth a violation of § 1986, a plaintiff must first prove a violation
of § 1985, its predicate, which prohibits discriminatory conspiracies. 63 A
plaintiff need not prove that a § 1986 defendant had the discriminatory intent
requirement of § 1985.' 4 Rather, the plaintiff need only demonstrate: (1) the
defendant had actual knowledge of the § 1985 conspiracy; (2) the defendant
had the power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the § 1985
violation; (3) the defendant neglected or refused to prevent the § 1985 con-
spiracy; and (4) a wrongful act was committed by the conspirators.65 The
defendant is liable for all damages that he or she could have prevented with
reasonable diligence.6 Knowledge of rumors may satisfy the first element.67
A showing of negligence suffices to prove a violation of the section.6' To
escape liability, a defendant need only exercise reasonable diligence to pre-
vent commission of the § 1985 conspiracy.69
Thus, a violation of § 1986 turns on the potential defendant's ability to
prevent execution of a class-based conspiracy under § 1985. Initially, it may
59. Id.
60. Id. at 668-69.
61. FONER, supra note 50, at 454-55.
62. Id.
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1994).
64. Id.; 3 JOSEPH G. CooK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIoNS 13.10
(1998).
65. Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295 (3d Cir. 1994); see CHESTER J. ANTEAU &
GARY E. BAIR, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTs ACrs: CIVIL PROCEDuRE § 281 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp.
1995).
66. Clark, 20 F.3d at 1298.
67. Id. at 1296-97.
68. See id. at 1298;see alsoParkv. City ofAtlanta, 120 F.3d 1157,1160(1lthCir. 1997)
(citing Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290 (3d Cir. 1994)).
69. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1258 (7th Cir. 1984).
ANATOMY OF ANAFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROTECT
seem startling and perhaps even inconsistent with ordinary notions of liability
in our legal system that liability is predicated upon such a low, indirect level
of personal involvement. However, as elaborated throughout this Article, the
unusual and extreme nature of the underlying harm justifies the statute's
reach. In addition, a vital limiting principle to the affirmative obligation to
protect imposed by § 1986 is that protection is only required from a § 1985
conspiracy. Nonetheless, a § 1986 defendant need not have been a member
of the § 1985 conspiracy, nor have been involved in it, as mere knowledge of
the conspiracy and failure to exercise reasonable diligence to prevent it suffice
to impose liability. Therefore, the statute represents a significant extension
of liability beyond ordinary limits, although the need to make out a violation
of § 1985 restricts its scope.
The standards for liability under § 1985 are quite stringent. Because sub-
section three of § 1985 is the most commonly used, it will serve as the focus
of this discussion. 0 Subsection three reads in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authori-
ties of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within
such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws;.., in any case of
conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein
do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such con-
spiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived
of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery
of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or
more of the conspirators.7
Thus, the elements of a violation under this section are as follows: (1) the
defendants did "conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises
of another"; (2) the defendants acted "for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws"; and (3) one
or more conspirators did or caused to be done "any act in furtherance of the
70. Subsection one prohibits conspiracies directed at interfering with the duties ofgovern-
ment employees and officials, and is thus obviously limited in its applicability. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(1) (1994). Subsection two prohibits conspiracies to interfere with court proceedings,
as well as conspiracies "for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any
manner, the due course ofjustice... with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of
the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing.., the right of any person...
to the equal protection of the laws." Id. § 1985(2).
71. Id. § 1985(3).
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 461 (1999)
object of [the] conspiracy," whereby another was (a) "injured in his person or
property" or (b) "deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States."72
To plead acivil rights conspiracy underthis section, aplaintiffmustallege
that the defendants reached a conspiratorial agreement to violate one or more
of the protected conspiracy, rights, as discussed infra, that a conspirator per-
formed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the act caused
injury.73 Further, because "[t]he very nature of a conspiracy obscures most, if
not all, information about the alleged conspirators' agreement," the complaint
"must simply plead sufficient facts from which a conspiracy can be inferred;
the facts detailing the conspiratorial agreement can be pleaded generally."'74
Additionally, a conspiratorial agreement can be proved inferentially from
circumstantial evidence. The gist of a civil conspiracy is an agreement
between the defendants to violate the law. Again, because of the inchoate
nature of conspiracies, direct evidence of the agreement often does not exist.
However, a person may legally be considered a coconspirator without taking
part in an overt act and without expressly agreeing to join the conspiracy if he
or she tacitly authorizes, encourages, ratifies, or otherwise exhibits agreement
with the conspiratorial aims.75 This standard is not dissimilar to the criminal
law standard for accomplice liability, which requires little affirmative evi-
dence indicating agreement.76 Thus, § 1985 conspiracies encompass all who
intend to and act to encourage the conspiratorial aims. A defendant must
personally intend to join the conspiracy as evidenced by engaging in an act or
acts indicating authorization or encouragement. Inaction by a defendant will
not suffice to impose liability.
72. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971).
73. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651,659-60 (1951) (outlining elements ofcivil rights
conspiracy); Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1983) (same).
74. Quinones v. Szore, 771 F.2d 289,291 (7th Cir. 1985); see Bums v. Cineplex Odeon,
Inc., No. 95 C 5280, 1996 WL 501742, at *8 (N.D. I11. Sept. 3, 1996) ("[Tlhe Complaint must
make a general allegation of a conspiracy that is supported by sufficient factual allegations to
suggest a 'meeting of the minds' between the parties to the conspiracy." (quoting Kunik v.
Racine County, 946 F.2d 1574, 1580 (7th Cir. 1991))); cf Dwares v. City of New York, 985
F.2d94,100 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[W]hile aplaintiffshould notplead mere evidence, he should make
an effort to provide some 'details of time and place and the alleged effect of the conspiracy."').
75. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1256 (7th Cir. 1984). For example,
to hold a supervisory official liable for a civil rights conspiracy, "[a]t a minimum plaintiff must
show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct of offending officers." Id. (citing Hayes v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d
869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982)).
76. See, e.g.,N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6 (West 1995) (setting forth similar standard forjury
instructions on accomplice liability); cf Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770,777 n.10 (1975)
(finding that agreement in criminal conspiracy need not be explicit and may be inferred from
circumstances (citing Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711-13 (1943))).
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Interpretation of the second element-the intent requirement-has occu-
pied most ofthe Supreme Court's attention in construing § 1985(3). The intent
requirement of the statute was set forth by the Supreme Court in Griffin v.
Breckenridge,' the leading case construing the section: "The language requir-
ing intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities,
means there mustbe some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."'78 In other words, the
discriminatory intent must target a group to which the plaintiff belongs, rather
than the plaintiffs as an individual. Moreover, "the right must be 'aimed at;'
its impairment must be a conscious objective of the enterprise," that excludes
conspiracies intended only incidentally to affect the protected right.79
Whether the language of § 1985 concerning "class-based... animus"
covers conspiracies other than race-based ones is still an open question in the
Supreme Court. 0 Many lower courts have sustained § 1985(3) claims charg-
ing gender-based, religion-based, and disability-based conspiracies," among
others.8" This Article focuses primarily on race-based conspiracies.83
Another important question addressed by the Court has been whether, or
to what extent, § 1985(3) covers private conspiracies to violate protected
rights, rather than conspiracies involving only state action. The Griffin Court
adverted to the statutory language "going in disguise," mentioned that it
referred to private conduct, and noted that the statute's failure to include a
state action requirement was a significant indication of legislative intent to
include private conduct." Not all private conspiracies, however, are included
within the scope of the statute. Actionable private conspiracies must aim at
"interfering with rights" that are "protected against private, as well as official,
77. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
78. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
79. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 275 (1993) (citations
omitted).
80. See United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners ofArn., Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,
836 (1983) ("[l]t is a close question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based
animus otherthan animus againstNegroes and those who championed their cause, most notably
Republicans."); see also Bray, 506 U.S. at 269 (finding no need to resolve question of whether
sex discrimination could create class for purposes of § 1985, and thus reserving issue); cf. Great
Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 389 n.6 (1979) (White, J., dissenting)
(noting that Court had "correctly assume[d]" that statute covered sex discrimination).
81. See, e.g.,Lakev. Arnold, 112F.3d 682,688-89 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing disability);
Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968-69 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing gender); Emanuel v.
Barry, 724 F. Supp. 1096, 1101-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (discussing religion).
82. COOK & SOBIESI, supra note 64, 13.09[A] (listing groups found to constitute
class); RODNEY SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS Acrs § 15.04 (3d ed. 1998) (same).
83. While I will refer herein to racist conspiracies, I do not mean to exclude other groups
that have been denominated protected classes under § 1985.
84. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96-97 (1971).
477
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 461 (1999)
encroachment."85 If the object of a conspiracy is to deprive a victim of
constitutional rights protected only against state infringement, § 1985(3) is not
violated "unless it is proved that the State is involved in the conspiracy or that
the aim of the conspiracy is to influence the activity of the State.,
86
Thirteenth Amendment rights incident to the abolition of slavery are
among the few constitutional civil rights actionable against wholly private
conduct.87 Whether Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment itself accom-
plished more than the simple abolition of slavery remains an open question.88
However, pursuant to Section 2, the Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth
Amendment, Congress may enact legislation "to abolish both the conditions
of involuntary servitude and the 'badges and incidents of slavery."' 89 The
right to interstate travel, resting in part on Thirteenth Amendment authority,
was cited by the Griffin Court as one constitutional right "assertable against
private as well as governmental interference."" The right to be free from
public or private racist violence - the concern at the heart of § 1985 - should
also be actionable as authorized by the Thirteenth Amendment, even without
proof of intent to interfere with interstate travel.9 As a corollary to this
85. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at826; accordBray v.AlexandriaWomen's Health Clinic, 506
U.S. 263, 274 (1993) ("A section 1985(3) private conspiracy... requires an intent to deprive
persons of a right guaranteed against private impairment.").
86. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 830
(1983). Whether § 1985 encompasses conspiracies to violate federal civil rights statutes, rather
than constitutional rights, is not entirely clear. But cf Fisher v. Shamburg, 624 F.2d 156, 159
(10th Cir. 1980) (finding that private racist conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of right to public
accommodation is actionable).
87. The Supreme Court decided in Novotny that a conspiracy to violate women employ-
ees' Title VII rights could not be a § 1985(3) violation because it would impair the effectiveness
of Title VII's remedial scheme. See Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S.
366, 378 (1979). The Court did not address whether conspiracies to violate federal statutes, as
opposed to constitutional rights, could ever violate § 1985(3).
88. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1981).
89. See id. at 124-25 (citing and quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883));
see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) ("Congress has the power
under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents
of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.").
90. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1971); see Bray, 506 U.S. at 274 (dis-
cussing right to interstate travel).
91. Some lower courts have required careful pleading of violations of the Thirteenth
Amendment, as opposed to the right to equal protection generally, before sustaining § 1985
claims against private actors. Compare Peavey v. Polytechnic Inst. of N.Y., 775 F. Supp. 75,
79 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (dismissing plaintiff's claim of private racial and religious bias premised
on Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection because court found no state action), and
Emanuel v. Barry, 724 F. Supp. 1096, 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding private anti-Semitic
conspiracy not actionable because plaintiffs alleged deprivation of equal protection right to be
secure in their persons, which is "not among the rights the Constitution guarantees against
private deprivation"), with Johnson v. Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235, 238 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (upholding
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doctrine, if governmental conduct (or its private counterpart under state action
doctrine)' is involved, conspiracies to violate the full range of constitutional
rights relating to equal protection, privileges, and immunities are actionable
under § 1985(3).
In summary, a § 1986 claim is dependent upon establishing an underlying
conspiracy claim under § 1985. Section 1986 then acts to reinforce and extend
§ 1985 by permitting claims against defendants not implicated under § 1985.
That is, a § 1985 defendant must be a conspirator and must have joined in the
illegal conspiracy by at least manifesting his or her agreement with the con-
spiratorial plan. While evidence of mere encouragement of the conspiracy
rather than direct participation may suffice to establish coconspirator liability,
the existence of some evidence of an active link between this defendant and
the conspiracy is necessary. Section 1986, on the other hand, requires no such
direct connection to the conspiratorial agreement. It attaches liability for culp-
able inaction. It renders responsible those whose knowledge places them
closest to the underlying conspiracy regardless of whether or not they acted
affirmatively.
IV. Effectiveness in Addressing Extreme Harm Justifies the Duty to
Rescue or Protect Under § 1986
A. Prevention of Extreme Harm Is the Primary Rationale
for the Statute
A number of justifications - legal, moral, and pragmatic - can be ad-
vanced to support the extension of liability contained in § 1986. The most
important is the extremely serious nature of the underlying harm addressed by
§ 1986. As a matter of morality or policy, a more severe underlying harm
normally would justify a correspondingly stronger duty to prevent harm. That
principle applies forcefully in this instance.
Continued widespread racism inthe South and Southern states' concomi-
tant refusal to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment necessitated the passage of
§ 1986 in 1871. The stubborn persistence of racist violence threatened to
undermine any attempts to reach even a fragile national unity and impose
federal authority on the region.93 The refusal of government officials and law
§ 1985 claim after private defendants burned cross outside of black family's home). But see
Spencer v. Casavilla, 44 F.3d 74, 77-79 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding racially motivated murder of
black youth by white youths crying "[d]ie, nigger" is not actionable under § 1985(3) because
defendants did not intend to interfere with right to interstate travel or familial relationships).
The result in this case seems clearly wrong, given that the actions of the defendants were at the
heart of the concerns the passage of § 1985 addressed.
92. See West v. Adkins, 487 U.S. 42,54 (1988) (finding that private individual perform-
ing state functions acts "under color of law" for § 1983 purposes).
93. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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enforcement agencies to enforce the law was particularly problematic.94 Their
inaction in the face of continued racial oppression effectively denied the pro-
tection of the post-Civil War Constitution to black citizens. For that reason,
this Article focuses, in particular, on the liability of public officials.
As the 1870s progressed, the country grew increasingly disenchanted
with Reconstruction. The United States simply lacked the political will to
forge a national commitment to eradicate the legacy of slavery.' The federal
government abandoned and dismantled the machinery of Reconstruction,
leaving the South to its own devices.96 After that, emboldened white suprema-
cists engaged in a pattern of lynching, harassment, and oppression of blacks
that continued for decades.97
The pattern of governmental underenforcement continued into the 1960s,98
as the police refused to prevent attacks on civil rights workers by racist groups,
including the Ku Klux Klan. 9 As demonstrated by certain recent events, the
problem has abated, but has not stopped."° Section 1986 can be instrumental
in further limiting these racial conspiracies. It gives those in the best position
to prevent § 1985 conspiracies an incentive to act. A realistic threat of § 1986
liability could propel an officer or bystander with knowledge of impending
execution of a racist conspiracy to offer the reasonable protection required by
the statute.
In addition, the morality of imposing an affirmative dutyto protectvictims
of racist conspiracies is from this perspective even stronger than the morality
supporting a general duty to rescue (for example, the duty to rescue an accident
victim).'0 ' The evil intent motivating racist conspiracies, amplified by our long
94. FONER, supra note 50, at 433-46.
95. See generally id. (discussing United States's treatment of slavery issue).
96. See id. at 587-601 (discussing effects of termination of Reconstruction in South).
97. Id.; see BERRY, supra note 7, passim; see also GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 552-53 (1944) ("It is notorious
that practically never have white lynching mobs been brought to court in the South, even when
the killers are known to all in the community and are mentioned by name in the local press.").
98. See BERRY, supra note 7, passim.
99. See Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (evaluating
§ 1986 claim that former Freedom Rider brought against FBI agents for falling to block conspir-
acy by vigilantes and local police and for falling to respond to attack for 15 minutes); United
States v. U.S. Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 194 F. Supp. 897, 907 (M.D. Ala. 1961)
(issuing injunction against Ku Klux Klan prohibiting attacks on civil rights workers and against
police for failure to protect plaintiffs from attack).
100. See generally Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1293-94 (3d Cir. 1994); see also
Wallerv. Butkovich, 584 F. Supp. 909,920 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (stating claims under §§ 1985 and
1986 against law enforcement agents for failure to intervene in lethal Klan and Nazi attack on
anti-Klan protesters).
101. While I would support a general duty to rescue and consider the arguments set forth
by a number of commentators in this regard persuasive, see generally John M. Adler, Relying
ANATOMY OFANAFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROTECT
history of oppression of African-Americans, distinguishes the situations, as it
exacerbates the harm caused to the victims. When an individual is targeted for
reprisal based on an immutable characteristic such as race, and when that
characteristic has fated the individual to a permanent lesser status in a culture,
reinforcement of the victim's powerlessness only corroborates and reinstills a
message of permanent victimhood and despair. 0 2 Moreover, racial violence,
in effect, denies blacks the right to citizenship. Since the Civil War, racial
violence has been a primary weapon of hate groups that have used it to intimi-
date African-Americans and keep them from exercising their civil rights. 3
The harm thatthe conspiracy perpetrates on society is, in that sense, worse than
the harm that an accident causes. °4 In protecting against race-based conspira-
cies, § 1986 not only protects the particular victims, but also protects the
community at large from the evil of violence motivated by racial animus.
Racial violence causes severe harm to American democracy and its
foundational values and principles. Not only are such acts inherently perni-
cious, but they echo the incredibly destructive racial subordination that was
institutionalized as the system of slavery, an institution whose legacy persists
today. That corrosive system utterly belied the fundamental premise of liberal
democracy that equality for all is a precondition of enduring liberty. Its
remnants continue to plague us. Given this history, all members of American
society bear a heightened responsibility to intervene to minimize racist con-
spiracies and the ravages of racist violence. The harms flowing from the
system of slavery and America's resulting responsibility justify both § 1986
and related extensions of liability.
Since Reconstruction, Congress has recognized the unique harms caused
by racism and has legislated against them numerous times.'05 The Supreme
upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of Com-
mon Law Affirmative Duties to.AidorProtect Others, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 867; Thomas C. Galli-
gan, Jr., Aiding and Altruism: A MythopsycholegalAnalysis, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 439
(1994); Steven J. Heyman, Foundations ofthe Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673 (1994);
Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the
Law ofAffirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986), it is not my intention in this Article
to support the duty to rescue under § 1986 on this basis.
102. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A TortActionforRacial Insults, Epithets,
andName-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 136-37 (1982); Mar J. Matsuda, Public
Response toRacist Speech: Consideringthe Victim 'sStory, 87MICH.L.REv. 2320,2336 (1989).
103. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
104. Consider a drowning, ahomicidal drowning, and ahomicidal drowning motivated by
race. Society has an increasingly strong basis to require reasonable rescue in the second and
third situations because the motivating criminal intent becomes progressively more evil. The
degree ofevil demonstrated by aparticular action is gauged with reference to the history, cultural
context, values, and traditions of the society. In light of American history and tradition, racially
motivated evils can be seen as even worse than evil acts perpetrated without any racial intent.
105. The 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act is only one example of several civil rights acts that
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Court has ratified Reconstruction-era civil rights legislation by upholding, for
instance, a broad construction of § 1985(3) in Griffin v. Breckenridge'" and
a broad construction of § 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act in Jones v. Alfred
H Mayer Co. 07 The Court also recognized in Brown v. Board ofEducation"'
the damage done by racism and the role of the Fourteenth Amendment in
rectifying racism."° The Court has reiterated its condemnation of racist con-
duct a number of times since 1954." 0
As recounted earlier in this Article, Congress enacted the 1871 Civil
Rights Act in part to counter the passivity and complicity of Southern officials
in the face of racial violence."' In light of that history, § 1986 should be
Congress passed during Reconstruction. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN
LAW §§ 1.12-13, at 36-39 (1992).
106. 403 U.S. 88,97-102 (1971).
107. 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968). The Court reasoned:
Negro citizens, North and South, who saw in the Thirteenth Amendment a promise
of freedom - freedom to "go and come at pleasure" and to "buy and sell when they
please" - would be left with "a mere paper guarantee" if Congress were powerless
to assure that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a
dollar in the hands of a white man. At the very least, the freedom that Congress is
empowered to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy
whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,443 (1968).
108. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
109. Brownv. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483,489-93 (1954) (discussing role of Fourteenth
Amendment in removing distinctions based on race).
110. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).
What we have [in the hate crime ordinance at issue is] ... a prohibition of fighting
words that contain... messages of "bias-motivated" hatred and in particular,...
messages "based on virulent notions of racial supremacy." One must wholeheart-
edly agree with the Minnesota Supreme Court that "[it] is the responsibility, even
the obligation, of diverse communities to confront such notions in whatever form
they appear ......
Id. (quoting In re Welfare ofR.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508,511 (Minn. 1991), rev'd, 505 U.S.
377 (1992)); see United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563, 566 (1968) (referring to "hoodlums
operating in the fashion ofthe Ku Klux Klan" in upholding prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 241,
federal criminal civil rights statute derived from Enforcement Act of 1870).
111. I should notethattheharm ofaracistconspiracy increases when it is executed in public
and the government (or the public) acquiesces. A privately conceived and planned conspiracy
may be intentionally executed in public in order to intimidate its victims and their supporters
from responding. Essentially, publicly enacted conspiracies carry an intensified message of
threat and coercion, which is exacerbated when the victims cannot rely on the authorities (or
fellow citizens) for protection. Section 1986 focuses on these authorities (and knowledgeable
bystanders) and targets them for liability. And even if the conspiracy is executed in private, its
victims are doubly harmed if they have no recourse in the form ofpolice assistance. See Johnson
v. Harron, No. 91 -CV- 1460,1995 WL 319943, at* 1 -*3 (N.D.N.Y. May 23,1995) (stating claim
under §§ 1985 and 1986). In Johnson, customs officials detained an African-American man and
his white wife at the Canadian border. Id During the detention, the customs inspectors threat-
ANATOMY OFANAFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROTECT
interpreted similarly to focus on responsible officials who fail to protect
victims of racist violence. Most of those litigating under § 1986 have brought
suit against such public defendants, presumably in recognition of their primary
responsibility to engage in rescue efforts."' Moreover, official refusal to
control crime is especially morally blameworthy because of the denial of
responsibility that normally accompanies it. That denial becomes the entire
public's denial when the government is an actor. In addition, once the govern-
ment has endorsed a position of nonintervention, every governmental agent
involved in these racially charged situations is immunized from responsibility.
Absent legal compulsion in these situations, only exceptional individuals can
be expected to take a moral stand and act to prevent further violence. "3 Thus,
legal, in addition to political processes, are sometimes needed to ensure
adequate protection. Section 1986 fortifies constitutional antidiscrimination
mandates and imposes societal responsibility for a societal problem.
B. Effectiveness in Addressing Harm by Providing a Remedy Where
No Other Remedy ls Available
Not only must the harm from which relief is sought be extreme, but a
fully justified statute must effectively address that harm. 4 The case law
construing § 1986, although relatively sparse, confirms the statute's utility in
providing an avenue of redress in situations where no alternative relief is
available. The statute's rationale, then, is in part pragmatic. Concerns about
the advisability of attaching liability to the inaction of defendants who were
ened the husband with physical harm, stripped him, subjected him to a body cavity search, and
berated him with ongoing racist abuse. Id. The bystanding state police officer did not intervene
to stop the abuse. li
112. See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
113. See HANNAHARENDT, EICHMANNINJERUSALEM: AREPORTONTHEBANAL1TYOFEVIL
267 (1963) (commenting in this regard on trial of Adolph Eichmann in Israel). Arendt stated:
IThejudges did not believe [Eichmann], because they were too good, and perhaps
also too conscious of the very foundations of their profession, to admit that an
average, "normal" person, neither feeble-minded nor indoctrinated nor cynical,
could be perfectly incapable of telling right from wrong. They preferred to con-
clude from occasional lies that he was a liar - and missed the greatest moral and
even legal challenge of the whole case. Their case rested on the assumption that the
defendant, like all "normal persons," must have been aware of the criminal nature
of his acts, and Eichmann was indeed normal insofar as he was "no exception
within the Nazi regime." However, under the conditions of the Third Reich only
"exceptions" could be expected to react "normally." This simple truth of the matter
created a dilemma for the judges which they could neither resolve nor escape.
Id.
114. Morally, the statute is justified if it actually and effectively addresses the harm at
which it is aimed. Legally, the statute is justified if it effectively enforces the Equal Protection
Clause, under which authority it was enacted.
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not involved in the conspiracy are outweighed by the necessity of attacking
the underlying evil. In the most dramatic example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Clark v. Clabaugh, the case that in broad
strokes introduces this Article, denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment and set down fortrial claims of liability under §§ 1985 and 1986.15
As described in the opinion:
Hanover Center Square, in HanoverBorough, York County, Pennsylva-
nia, was the site of a disgraceful two-day spectacle of racial unrest which
ignited between the members of a self-styled interracial youth group on the
one side, and aband of all-white motorcyclists and a crowd of townspeople
on the other. The incidents which gave rise to this cause of action were
preceded by a rumor, which apparently circulated about town for two
weeks, that the white bikers were conspiring to assemble in the Square on
the evening ofJuly 13, 1991, to drive the interracial group, which regularly
congregated and socialized in the Square, out of Hanover. In fact, on the
evening of July 13th, the interracial group and the white bikers did assem-
ble in the Square, apparently in anticipation of and prepared for a hostile
confrontation. The presence of the two groups, as well as, presumably, the
effect of the rumors, incited the participation of many townspeople who
had also gathered as spectators and as supporters of the bikers....
In short, by midnight of July 13th, a volatile assemblage of approxi-
mately 40 interracial youth group members, twelve or more white bikers
and approximately 200 to 300 townspeople had gathered in the Square.
A racially charged altercation and exchange of taunts, challenges, accusa-
tions, and obscenities ensued. Only six Hanover police officers were
present.... [O]ver 500 townspeople congregated on the street outside [a
nearby] apartment building on the evening of July 14th to confront mem-
bers of the interracial group gathered on the rooftop [of the building].
Again, a racial altercation ensued, but this time the two factions threw
objects such as stones and bottles at each other. Police officers ascended
the fire escape, arrested all the members of the interracial group present on
the rooftop and charged them with disorderly conduct." 6
Members of the white mob on the street were not arrested. The opinion
continues by describing further racial incidents occurring that evening in
which the police failed to protect the victims."
7
It is extremely troubling that such a riot could occur in the United States
in 1991."' It is even more troubling that police inaction compounded the
problem by adding the imprimatur of the state to the events and making it
clear that the youth group had no protection from the mob. Congress enacted
115. See Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290,1298 (3d Cir. 1994) (denying summary judg-
ment).
116. Id. at 1293-94.
117. Id.
118. See supra note 1 (indicating that riot took place only months after Rodney King
incident).
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§ 1986 precisely to provide a remedy to plaintiffs in situations such as this.
Although no serious physical injuries occurred during the Hanover riot,"9
striking parallels between this situation and Klan violence in the Reconstruc-
tion-era South exist. These range from overtly racist references to alleged
miscegenation 2' to the vigilante tactics of the bikers" and the white mob's
participation with the bikers," finally culminating with the police refusal to
intervene until they made mass arrests of the interracial group members."
Moreover, the plaintiffs in the interracial youth group would have had no
potential remedy against the police absent § 1986, because no evidence
existed of police involvement in the bikers' conspiracy.124 The police arrested
only the interracial group and not members of the mob, and that may well
indicate racial motivation, but additional evidence of racially discriminatory
intent would be necessary to state an equal protection claim under § 1983.1'
Nor would a due process-based claim of the violation of the duty to protect
exist under DeShaney.126 Evidence did exist, however, of the mayor's and the
119. See Clark, 20 F.3d at 1293 (stating that incident did not involve any serious bodily
harm).
120. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 85, Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290 (3d
Cir. 1994) (No. 1: CV-92-0595) ("I hope the baby rots inside you before it comes out because
we don't need any more niggers.") (on file with the author); id % 155, 158.
121. Id. % 42-44, 64, 67, 69, 71, 89.
122. See id. 57 ("Members of the White mob approached the interracial group and yelled
'niggers,' 'nigger lovers,' 'white trash,' 'little girls with niggers,' 'we're going to get you,
niggers,' 'nigger bitch,' 'niggers, go back where you came from' and other anti-Black slurs.");
see also id. % 55, 56, 96, 97.
123. Id. % 91, 92, 108, 112, 128, 152, 153. The defendants in this case included the
mayor and police chief, several Hanover police sergeants, individual police officers who were
on the scene, and the motorcycle gang members who initiated the violence. Id. % 19-38. As
the highest town officials with foreknowledge of the incipient riot, the mayor and the police
chief bear the greatest responsibility for the events, and hence culpability. The police sergeant
who had received advance information concerning the impending racial confrontation and who
failed to take adequate protective action, id. 51, would bear a lesser, but still significant,
responsibility. Of the individual police officer defendants, those best able, because of prior
knowledge and proximity to unfolding events, to take protective action would be more culpable
under § 1986. For instance, on at least one occasion, white members of the mob physically
attacked a member of the interracial group in the presence of Hanover police officers. The offi-
cers failed to stop the attack or arrest the offenders. Id. 88. On a number of other occasions,
instead of protecting interracial youth group members from the mob's racist threats ofviolence,
officers insteadarrestedtheplaintiffs fordisorderly conduct. Id. I 108-116,126-134,140-160.
While the degree of culpability of a defendant is not itself relevant to liability under § 1986 if
the defendant's conduct meets the requisite standards for liability, culpability is certainly
relevant to a determination of an appropriate level of damages.
124. Id. passim.
125. Evidence of racially discriminatory intent is necessary to state an equal protection
claim. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-44 (1976).
126. See infra text accompanying notes 249-54.
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police chiefs prior knowledge of the bikers' plans to run the interracial group
out of town. The ability of the police to act with reasonable diligence to
prevent further consequences of the conspiracy is evident, given that they
were able to call a curfew and quell the violence on the second night of the
riot. This case thus exemplifies the continued relevance of and need for
§ 1986. It simply would not be just to leave the plaintiffs without legal
recourse against the police in this situation.
There are other examples of § 1986 claims alleged successfully in cases
in which no other legal claim would have been available to the plaintiffs against
police defendants. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Green v. Francis'27 upheld ajury verdict arising out of an incident in which the
home ofan elderly black couple was riddled with a heavy barrage of gunfire. '
The couple's son was chased and fired upon by an armed band as he fled to seek
help for his parents.'29 The private defendants, neighbors ofthe couple, appar-
ently were enraged over a racially tinged boundary line dispute with the plain-
tiffs. 30 Although the plaintiffs repeatedly sought the assistance of the county
sheriff's department, the sheriff and his two deputies did very little to assist
them or to investigate the incident. 3' Ultimately, the plaintiffs were forced to
flee their home of thirty years to escape further danger.
32
The sheriff and deputies were sued under § 1986 for failing to assist the
plaintiffs and failing to investigate the incident that was the culmination of a
§ 1985 conspiracy among the private defendants.' Following ajury verdict
awarding damages to the plaintiffs and a decision granting declaratory and
injunctive relief, the private defendants appealed, although the police defen-
dants did not. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld
the verdict.'34 Consequently, the opinion does not discuss § 1986, butthe case
is noteworthy in presenting a classic factual situation for relief under that
statute. No other claims against the official defendants would have been
available to the plaintiffs to challenge the defendants' inaction. No special
relationship existed, nor did the sheriff and deputies create a danger. Section
1986 considerably widens the circle of potential defendants to include the
police, whose knowledge and ability to prevent harm placed them in a unique
position to prevent further harm and made them appropriate defendants. The
127. 705 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1983).
128. See Green v. Francis, 705 F.2d 846, 848-49 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding ample evidence
to support plaintiffs' claim).
129. Id. at 848.
130. See id. (stating that plaintiffs and defendants were involved in emotional litigation).
131. Id.
132. See id. (stating that violence drove plaintiffs from their home).
133. Id. The plaintiffs also brought claims under §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988. Id.
134. See id. at 848-49 (upholding verdicts).
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police could have acted to ameliorate the situation and perhaps allow the
plaintiffs to remain in their home. Their failure to protect against a racist
conspiracy was actionable under § 1986, and properly so.
C. Effectiveness in Reaching the Underlying Evil Justifies the Extension of
Liability Beyond the Scope of § 1985
This subpart examines the problem of justification from a somewhat
different perspective. In order effectively to deter or prevent the evil of racist
conspiracies, parties, in addition to those already subject to liability under
§ 1985, must be reachable. This need militates in favor of applying the
reasons justifying § 1985 to § 1986. As discussed in the previous section,
§ 1986 expands liability beyond that of § 1985 by widening the circle of
potential defendants to include nonconspirators with knowledge of the con-
spiracy and the ability to prevent it. It shifts the relevant legal inquiry from
the defendant's bad intent and acts to a determination of whether the defen-
dant had a realistic ability to prevent the consequences of illegal racist con-
spiracies. The primary harm to be blocked, deterred, or compensated -
damage occasioned by a racist conspiracy - is virtually identical with respect
to both provisions. 3 ' Section 1986, however, focuses on a different, wider
group of parties who are causally responsible. Both sections are thus justifi-
able by largely overlapping sets of reasons. These sections appropriately
concentrate on deterring a particularly grievous harm by targeting either those
directly responsible or those sufficiently involved to be able to prevent the
harm, whose unwillingness to do so renders them morally responsible, given
the gravity of racist violence.
In addition, assuming that coconspirator liability under § 1985 is unob-
jectionable, the fine line between the standard for proving that liability-tacit
authorization of the conspiratorial objectives - and that for proving bystander
liability under § 1986 - knowledge and ability to act - can be crossed with
few grounds for objection. Therefore, if an officer observing the execution
of a racist conspiracy is not a coconspirator but merely a passive bystander,
that officer also should be liable for damages caused by the conspiracy that he
or she reasonably could have prevented. The goals of the 1871 Act provide
strong support for this conclusion.
3 6
135. The set of harms addressed by § 1986 is somewhat larger in that § 1986 encompasses
the harm that the inaction of officials or bystanders caused as well as the harm that the conspira-
tors directly caused. However, the focus of both § 1985 and § 1986 is on harm that the conspir-
acy itself occasioned. That is, legally the chain of causation is substantially weaker when one
reaches the bystanders. My argument, however, is premised in part on the assumption that an
attenuated form of causation is still present Morally, the harms that the actors and bystanders
caused may differ, but moral harm exists in both instances.
136. Compare this argument to the discussion in Part VI.B. See infra text accompanying
notes 249-73 (arguing for extension of constitutional tort liability in duty to protect or rescue
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Imagine a situation such as that in Clarkv. Clabaugh where rumors have
been circulating for weeks around a small town concerning an impending
racial altercation on a specific date by a group of white bikers and supportive
townspeople against an interracial group of black and white young people.'37
The police chief and mayor have heard days ahead of time of the plans. When
the appointed time arrives, however, they deploy only a few officers who
stand by and do nothing as the bikers and hundreds of local citizens riot and
chase the interracial group out of the square. The next evening, the mob
gathers again, hurling objects at the interracial group. When someone in the
vicinity of the interracial group starts throwing objects back at the white mob,
the police arrest every member of the interracial group, but not a single
member of the biker group or the mob.
In one variation of this fact'pattern, imagine further that the mayor and
police chief were overheard discussing the impending riot days in advance.
They tell the leader of the white biker group that they intend to do nothing to
stop the attack by the bikers, and agree that blacks do not belong in the town.
This variation contains direct evidence ofa conspiratorial agreement between
the officials and the bikers to violate the interracial group's Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. It clearly would support an action under
§ 1985."3
In a second variation, the police chief and mayor are seen conferring with
the biker group leader immediately before the riot. They vigorously nod their
heads, laugh, and walk back to the municipal building. Shortly thereafter, the
riot breaks out, and the few police officers on hand passively watch the
unfolding events. The police chief emerges from the police station with a
number of officers not long before the police arrest the interracial group. All
stroll to the scene, where they remain on the outskirts of the mob's attack until
moving in decisively to arrest the interracial group. The second scenario also
could evidence a § 1985 conspiracy, though the question is closer. The evi-
dence could permit an inference of authorization or encouragement by the
police sufficient to sustain a conspiracy claim, though it does not require that
conclusion. A factfimder reasonably could find either way.
In a third variation, corresponding to the actual facts of Clabaugh, no
evidence of the town officials' racial motivation or complicity with the bikers
situations beyond current limits to encompass at least those situations governed by § 1986).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17 (discussing facts of Clarkv. Clabaugh).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 70-92 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). It could
also support a § 1983 action. Although state action must be present in § 1983 cases, state action
does exist in conspiracies between police and private actors. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (stating that involvement of officials provides state action). Also, the
involvement of both the mayor and the police chief might support a finding of municipal
liability. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (discussing
municipal liability).
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exists.139 With no evidence of a conspiracy on the part of the four officials,
this scenario could sustain only a § 1986 claim against the police." The
bikers carry out the attack with the assistance of the townspeople, but police
reaction consists only of passivity during the attack, and later arresting the
entire interracial group when someone in the group's vicinity begins throwing
objects. Evidence of all elements of a § 1986 claim exists: The police had
prior knowledge of a § 1985 conspiracy and the power to prevent it, but they
failed to do so. In the absence of § 1986, however, the interracial group in
this variation would have no civil rights claim against the police.'
My point in elaborating these variations is that the plaintiffs should have
legal recourse in all three scenarios despite the lack of evidence of conspiracy
in the third variation: The evil to be blocked and the conduct of the police do
not differ in any legally, morally, or politically significant way among the
three scenarios. The statutory objective of preventing and deterring these
conspiracies is not served by starkly distinguishing between the three varia-
tions outlined above such that the first two can result in liability while the
third cannot, particularly because no strong countervailing reasons exist to
make the distinction. The failure of the police to intervene despite prior actual
knowledge of the conspiracy is highly culpable and is similar to that of police
in Southern small-town racial attacks occurring earlier in the century.
4 2
Surely the civil rights acts passed during Reconstruction to enforce the post-
Civil War amendments should support these claims.
On an even more practical level, § 1986 is needed and justified because
coconspirator liability of police or other officials is often extremely difficult
to prove even when they have joined the conspiratorial objectives. Conspir-
acy cases can pose insurmountable proof problems because of the clandestine
nature of conspiracies. 43 Just as § 1985 defendants can don Klan robes and
139. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17 (describing facts of Clark v. Clabaugh).
140. The plaintiffs in Clabaugh would have a claim under § 1985 against the bikers assum-
ing the bikers aimed at interfering with the right to interstate travel. See supra notes 116-17 and
accompanying text. This conspiracy would be the predicate for the § 1986 claim against the
police. The utility of a claim directly against the bikers is limited because normally these
defendants are practicallyjudgment-proof. Moreover, the moral and political significance of a
verdict against them is much less than that of a verdict against the police. The plaintiffs would
not have a § 1983 claim against the police for disparate treatment of the white and interracial
groups based onthe arrests ofthe latter but notthe formerbecause there is no additional evidence
of an intent to discriminate on the part of the police. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
238-44 (1976) (discussing need to demonstrate discriminatory intent in order to bring equal
protection claim).
141. This third version corresponds to the available evidence in Clarkv. Clabaugh. Clark
v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1290 (3d Cir. 1994).
142. BERRY, supra note 7, passim (discussing incidents of racial violence).
143. See Clark, 20 F.3d at 1296 (stating that nature of conspiracies typically precludes
direct evidence).
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hoods to conceal their identities, police and officials can conceal their in-
volvement by apparent passivity. Proving that a passive official has tacitly or
expressly authorized, encouraged, or otherwise quietly furthered conspirato-
rial aims can be impossible unless a fellow conspirator confesses the conspira-
torial activities, which rarely occurs. On the other hand, proving that the same
individual had prior knowledge of a conspiracy and failed to exercise reason-
able diligence to prevent it is a more realistic endeavor.1" Essentially, diffi-
culty of proof inversely correlates with statutory effectiveness. Section 1986
eliminates many proof problems and thus increases the possibility of actually
blocking § 1985 conspiracies.
Once again, the case law construing § 1986 corroborates this conclusion.
A case from the Southern District of Texas resulted in issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction against the Ku Klux Klan's interference with Vietnamese
shrimp fisherman in Galveston Bay. It concerns not police defendants, but
private Klan officials. In Vietnamese Fishermen's Association v. Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan,145 plaintiffs sued under, inter alia, § § 1985(3) and 1986 to
prohibit the Klan from threatening violence against the fishermen. 46 Klan
officials and members, hooded and visibly armed, had taken a boat out into the
bay, fired a cannon, carried a figure of a fisherman in effigy, and made threats
against local fishermen and a business establishment that catered to the fisher-
men.147 Previously, they had held a rally and called upon the government to rid
the bay of the Vietnamese fishermen, stating that it "may become necessary to
take laws into our own hands" if the presence of Vietnamese fishermen in the
bay did not decrease.14 The speaker, the Grand Dragon of the Texas Klan, had
stated further that it was necessary to "fight fight fight" and see "blood blood
blood.' 49 He had also demonstrated how to burn a boat, and someone had
burned a cross as well. 0 Additional evidence of the defendants' actions, such
as burning other Vietnamese-owned or operated shrimp boats and pointing
guns at members of the class, verified the Klan's racial animus.'
The significance of the § 1986 claim in this case lies in its ability to
encompass all of the Klan defendants for purposes of demonstrating a likeli-
hood of success on the merits, thus warranting a preliminary injunction. It
would have been extremely difficult forthe plaintiffs to show that each individ-
144. For a private individual, reasonable diligence to prevent a conspiracy might involve
no more than calling the police.
145. 518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
146. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993,
999-1000 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (stating plaintiffs' claims).




151. See id. at 1015-16 (describing acts of violence and intimidation).
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ual who stood by during the threatening rallies had actually participated in the
§ 1985(3) conspiracy and there would have been further difficulties with the
lack of evidence of the exact scope of the conspiracy. For example, the plain-
tiffs could prove that the Grand Dragon had knowledge of the boat ride and that
Klan members would weartheir robes and carry semiautomatic weapons on the
boat, and that he failed to act to prevent the ride.'52 No additional evidence of
his complicity with the boat ride participants existed, however. Perhaps his
speech and prior knowledge could be considered sufficient encouragement of
the § 1985 conspiracy to justify finding him a coconspirator, but that task is
obviated and the analysis simplified by a § 1986 claim. Furthermore, the
troubling facts of this case include not only that the Grand Dragon may have
conspired with the other participants, but that, in the face of knowledge of
conspiratorial activities, he failed to block their enactment. His situation is
analogous to that of the Hanover mayor and police chief in that each had both
the responsibility and knowledge to avert the tragedy, but failed to do so.
A preliminary injunction under, inter alia, §§ 1985(3) and 1986 also was
issued in Lac Du Flambeau Band ofLake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop
Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc."5 3 The Chippewa Indian plaintiffs in that case
enjoined a group of white protesters from interfering with their treaty rights
to spearfish for walleye in northern Wisconsin lakes. 54 The protesters had
engaged in a pattern of harassing behavior that included stone throwing,
threats of harm, racial and sexual insults, property damage, and minor batter-
ies. "'55 To prevent the plaintiffs from catching fish, the protesters also blocked
boat landings, created wakes in the water, planted concrete walleye decoys,
and harassed the Indians when they were fishing by making loud noises.'56
152. See id. at 1001-02 (giving testimony of Grand Dragon as to his knowledge of"boat
ride").
153. Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-
Wis., Inc, 759 F. Supp. 1339, 1354 (W.D. Wis. 1991). For the subsequent history of this
litigation, see 41 F.3d 1190 (7th Cir. 1994); 991 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1993); 843 F. Supp. 1284
(W.D. Wis. 1994); and 781 F. Supp. 1385 (W.D. Wis. 1992). The court issued a preliminary
injunction on March 15, 1991. See Stop Treaty Abuse-Wis., 41 F.3d at 1192. On January 6,
1992, the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and issued a permanent
injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which provides that "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." Id. (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1982). Moreover, "[b]ecause full relief was available under section 1982, the district
court dismissed plaintiffs' other claims." Id. The dismissal of the §§ 1985 and 1986 claims
under these circumstances does not diminish the arguments I make in this section regarding the
value of § 1986 claims because § 1982 is only narrowly applicable to property claims and
because, under the facts of this case, evidence existed that the defendant leader of the organiza-
tion personally participated in racist activities.
154. See Stop Treaty Abuse-Wis., 759 F. Supp. at 1354 (describing relief granted).
155. Id. at 1344.
156. Id.
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The racist insults included such invective as: "Save a walleye, spear a squaw,"
"Timber nigger," "Custer had the right idea," "Scalp 'em," and "You're a
conquered nation; go home to the reservation.""1 7
After finding a likelihood of success on the merits of the plaintiffs'
§ 1985(3) claim, the court turned to the § 1986 claim, focusing on the individ-
ual defendant, a private individual, who was the leader of the protesters'
organization."'8 Because this defendant had been personally involved in
harassing protest activities and had a demonstrable influence on the organiza-
tion, the court implicitly concluded that he had the levels of both knowledge
and power it deemed necessary under § 1986 to stop further conspiratorial
actions.'59 Again, as in Vietnamese Fishermen 's Association, this defendant
conceivably could have been included in the § 1985(3) conspiracy, but § 1986
clarifies and simplifies the analysis by providing directly for liability." ° It
establishes a straightforward claim the strength of which lies in assigning
responsibility to those in the best position to block conspiratorial actions
regardless of their conscious intent or personal participation in the events.
In most of the cases discussed herein, top officials have been most
directly responsible for the decision not to take responsive action. Those
officers or organization members on the next level down of the hierarchy bear
a correspondingly lesser level of responsibility, as their ability to control
others decreases. On the other hand, their knowledge of the conspiracy may
be equal to or greater than that of their superiors, in which case reasonable
diligence under § 1986 should include alerting others to events or possible
methods of ameliorating the situation. Those least responsible in these cases
ordinarily would be bystanders not otherwise connected to the conspiracy.
None of the reported cases named a private bystander as a defendant under
§ 1986, an appropriate result under the statute because a bystander's reason-
able diligence could not consist of more than alerting the authorities to the
situation.
D. Section 1986 Is Effective in Providing Analytical Clarity
While Addressing the Underlying Evil in an Appropriate Fashion
The preceding sections have demonstrated that a primary strength of a
§ 1986 claim is its ability to reach the targeted harm directly. While certain
157. Id. at 1345.
158. Id. at 1352.
159. Id. The court apparently required a § 1986 defendant to have the individual power
to stop the conspiracy, rather than considering the reasonable diligence requirement in light of
the ability of the particular individual to take any blocking action. Id.
160. Presumably, because ofthe preliminary nature ofthe relief sought here, both opinions
are somewhat opaque concerning the relationship between § 1985 and § 1986 liability as
applied to the facts of those cases.
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§ 1986 claims also could be brought under alternative theories, in many
circumstances a § 1986 claim more precisely reaches the harm to be prevented
or compensated, whereas alternative statutory claims may require expansion
or distortion of their terms to encompass the allegedly illegal conduct. This
section presents additional cases that substantiate this conclusion.
Probably the most dramatic case is Bell v. City ofMilwaukee,16' in which
a police officer admitted, twenty years after the fact, that he and his partner
had shot and killed an African-American man without provocation in 1958,
and afterwards concocted a massive cover-up of the incident. 62 Upon hearing
this revelation, the victim's family filed suit under, inter alia, §§ 1983, 1985,
and 1986 against numerous police and municipal defendants and recovered
more than $1.5 million in damages after a federal jury trial. 63 Thejury found
liability under §§ 1985 and 1986, as well as other statutes.'" The plaintiffs
alleged that the responsible officers conspired with their supervising sergeant
and the Milwaukee police chief to conceal the facts of the shooting and that
these supervisory defendants failed to stop the conspiracy despite their knowl-
edge of it.165 Although there was no direct evidence of the supervisors'
participation in the cover-up, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit considered whether they implicitly authorized the patrol
officers' actions and shared the same general conspiratorial objective.'" The
court found sufficient evidence to sustain the sergeant's liability as a
coconspirator because he implicitly adopted subsequently written versions of
police reports thatjustified the shooting and sharply contradicted the responsi-
ble officers' first recounting of the incident. 67 The sergeant also gave disin-
genuous testimony at an inquest, indicating that the shooting officer had
related a consistent version of the incident on the night of the shooting. 68 His
liability was thus premised primarily upon ratification of the offending offi-
cers' conduct.
69
With regard to the police chief, however, the court determined that
insufficient evidence of conspiratorial involvement existed. The police chief
did not meet with the defendants nor did he testify at the inquest. 70 Rather,
his involvement was limited to knowledge of "the glaring conflicts in [the
161. 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
162. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1223 (7th Cir. 1984).
163. See id. at 1253-54 (describing jury's award of damages).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 1255-58 (discussing conspiracy to conceal facts).
166. See id. at 1257 (discussing implicit authorization or approval of conduct).
167. See id. at 1257-58 (discussing evidence supporting finding of coconspirators).
168. Id.
169. Id at 1257.
170. Id. at 1257-58.
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shooting officer's] explanation," '' and a failure to investigate further. This
was a sufficient basis for liability under § 1986:
As chief of police, Johnson had supervisory power over all other alleged
conspirators .... As the ultimate supervisor, cognizant soon after the
shooting of both the gravity of the matter and the inconsistencies in the
explanations of the shooting, it is an inevitable conclusion that Johnson
could have through reasonable diligence prevented or at least aided in
preventing... others from concealing the truth. [A number of the defen-
dants] manipulated the facts and packaged the incident without any appar-
ent interference from their ultimate supervisor. Milwaukee Police Depart-
ment internal rules require that the chief of police confer regularly with
district commanders and the inspector of detectives to be fully advised on
all matters of "serious departmental concern." Johnson testified that he
was cognizant of the internal rules and that the Bell killing was a matter of
serious departmental concern; yet he testified he never spoke with district
commanders or [the Inspector of Detectives] with respect to the matter.
Johnson's disregard of his obligation under departmental rules evidences
his failure to exercise reasonable diligence in connection with the Bell
matter. By neglecting to scrutinize and deter the efforts of [the other
defendants] to conceal the truth, Johnson is liable under Section 1986.72
Without § 1986, the police chief might well have had no legal obligation
to investigate or deter this serious cover-up by his subordinates. While a
possibility of supervisory liability under § 1983 existed, it is not explicitly
provided for by the statute." Section 1983 supervisory liability is premised
upon the employer/employee relationship and a consequent duty to ensure that
a subordinate's conduct complies with applicable law. 74 Courts, however, are
reluctant to uphold § 1983 liability on this theory, 75 presumably because the
statute itself, unlike § 1986, does not directly provide for imputed liability.
As a result, to prevail on a supervisory liability theory, the plaintiffs would
have had to prove the police chief's deliberate indifference to, or reckless or
callous disregard of the cover-up, while § 1986 requires only negligence.' 76
171. Id. at 1258.
172. Id.
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (stating that liability attaches if official "subjects, or
causes to be subjected" certain persons to deprivation of rights).
174. MICHAEL AVERYET AL., POLICEMISCONDuCTLAW AND LITIGATION § 4.4, at 4-7 (3d
ed. 1996) (stating that officers may be liable for failure to act if omission was callous, reckless,
or deliberate).
175. Id. § 4.13, at 4-22.
176. Id. § 4.4, at 4-7. Because the police chief was not present when the cover-up was
planned and executed and because the constitutional violation resulted from inaction, rather
than active participation, the police chief s violation is separate from that of the conspiring
officers and thus has an independent state of mind requirement. Id. § 4.5, at 4-8. Lower courts
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With § 1986, courts need not expand provisions such as § 1983 to cover
situations like Bell in which the defendant's liability is intuitively appealing,
but not definitively provided for by statute. A court construing a § 1986 claim
also can avoid struggling with the applicability of common-law doctrines such
as special relationship to federal statutory claims, because § 1986 explicitly
provides for liability in those instances. In Bell, § 1986 provided a necessary
tool to attack a cover-up at the highest levels of a department. 1" Given the
police chief's knowledge of the conspiracy and his responsibility for main-
taining departmental integrity, liability was appropriate and consistent with
the aims of the 1871 Civil Rights Act.178
InHawkv. Perillo,7 9 the plaintiffs could have brought a § 1986 claim but
elected not to. Instead, the plaintiffs claimed damages under only § § 1983 and
1985. I analyze this case by comparing the court's rationale and outcome with
the rationale and outcome that the plaintiffs might have have obtained under
§ 1986. This analysis again reveals the usefulness of creating a vehicle for
duty to protect claims that eliminates unnecessary evidentiary hurdles, screens
out nonmeritorious claims that do not comport with the policy objective of
assigning responsibility only to those with the knowledge and the ability to
avert serious damage, and directly attacks the problem of police noninter-
vention in the execution of class-based conspiracies.
Hawk v. Perillo is in many ways a classic case for § 1986 relief. It con-
cerns an allegation by three African-American men that they were confronted
by a white gang which yelled racist insults and physical threats at them.'
During the confrontation, one of the black men went into the restaurant to call
thepolice. Meanwhile, the othertwo menwere attacked and severely beaten.'
Two police officers then arrived, interviewed the two beating victims, and
obtained descriptions of the gang members. The officers indicated their
familiarity with the attackers."' During this period, three of the attackers
stood nearby and one of the officers then held a private conversation with
them, at which point the attackers fled. The police did not pursue them until
have consistently required plaintiffs to demonstrate more than negligence, generally requiring
deliberate indifference or a knowing, willful, or reckless state of mind. See id. (citing cases).
Many courts have required more than one incident to establish liability. Id. § 4.5, at 4-9.
177. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1253-61 (7th Cir. 1984).
178. See Perez v. Cucci, 725 F. Supp. 209, 254-56 (D.N.J. 1989) (finding defendant city
officials liable under § 1986 for allowing demotion of police detective plaintiff in violation of
plaintiff's First Amendment rights).
179. 642 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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they had run into an alley. Even then the officer ran only a short distance
before returning. The police interviewed no one at the scene.'
The plaintiffs brought claims under, inter alia, §§ 1983 and 1985(3).
They did not raise a § 1986 claim. The § 1983 claim alleged that the police
defendants failed to act to protect the plaintiffs because of their race.' The
court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that although a failure to protect
is not ordinarily actionable, a racially motivated failure to protect states an
equal protection claim."8 ' The court similarly upheld the § 1985 claim against
the police defendants, explaining that the facts sufficiently alleged a conspir-
acy between the police and the white gang.'86 The court also emphasized that
the private conversation between one officer and members of the white gang
and their subsequent flight with only a belated and aborted police pursuit
could indicate a conspiracy not to investigate the incident or make arrests.8 7
While at the pleading stage these claims sufficed to allow the action
against the police to proceed, to prevail on the § 1983 claim the plaintiffs
would have had to prove the racial motivation of the police. This is invariably
a difficult task, compounded in Hawk, as is often true, by the lack of direct
evidence. However, § 1986 requires no proof of racial animus. Under § 1985,
the plaintiffs would have had to prove the conspiracy between the officers and
gang members by a preponderance of the evidence, an unlikely proposition
given the paucity of the evidence.
By contrast, a § 1986 claim would have required only actual knowledge
by the police of the white gang's presumed conspiracy to attack the black men
and evade justice, an ability to block the outcome by pursuing and arresting
the offenders, and a failure to act. The plaintiffs' statements to the officers
and the officers' familiarity with the attackers could have shown knowledge
of the conspiracy. The officers' ability to act and failure to do so are evident.
By its terms, however, § 1986 refers to conspiratorial wrongs that "are about
to be committed," and to potential defendants who "neglect or refuse" to
"prevent or aid in preventing commission ofthe [conspiratorial acts]."'8 This
statutory language raises an issue whether officers who fail to apprehend
racist conspirators taking flight after overt conspiratorial acts have been
183. Id. at383.
184. Id. at 384.
185. Id. The court cited Monroe v. Pape for the proposition that failures to act can on
occasion state viable claims: "While one main scourge of the evil - perhaps the leading one-
was the Ku Klux Klan, the remedy created was not a remedy against it or its members but
against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a
state law." Hawk, 642 F. Supp. at 384 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961),
overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,700 (1978)).
186. Hawk v. Perillo, 642 F. Supp. 380, 385 (N.D. IIl. 1985).
187. Id.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
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committed are liable under § 1986. The statute is directed at those who fail
to prevent the conspiracy; failing to rectify its consequences afterwards may
not fall within the statutory ambit. On the other hand, the definition of the
underlying conspiracy may be broadened: It may extend to the conspirators'
evasion ofjustice, as well as to their commission of directly racist acts against
the plaintiffs.
This broader definition comports with the history ofthe 1871 Civil Rights
Act in that a central evil the Act confronted was the Klan's evasion ofjustice
and the Southern authorities' failure to apprehend perpetrators of racist
violence. In fact, Southern anarchy was perhaps the foremost problem that
Congress addressed in the Act." 9 A § 1986 claim in this case would have
incisively attacked the modern legal and moral problem this incident presents-
police negligence and indifference in the face of racist violence. Although
conscious, provable racial animus exacerbates the wrong committed by the
police, its nonexistence or the plaintiffs' inability to prove it does not mitigate
the harm a refusal to protect causes."9 That is the clarity that § 1986 confers.
The case of Harris v. City ofPagedale19' can instructively be compared
to the previously discussed cases. 92 In Harris, deliberate indifference by city
officials to a known pattern of sexual misconduct by city police officers led
to a jury verdict against the city." The plaintiff did not raise claims under
either §§ 1985 or 1986, but rather under § 1983. Numerous complainants had
accused several Pagedale police officers and the police chief of committing
sexual acts against them without their consent while the officers were on duty.
The police chief was aware of most if not all, of the allegations, and many of
the acts were committed in the presence of, or with the knowledge of, fellow
officers.'94 Although city officials were made aware of many of the com-
plaints, they engaged in no meaningful efforts to address the situation. 95 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the finding of
amunicipal policy of"persistently fail[ing] to remedy a known and continuing
pattern of unconstitutional police misconduct" engaged in with deliberate
indifference to the women victims' rights, and therefore upheld the jury
verdict in the plaintiff's favor.'" The unconstitutionality was presumably an
189. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st sess. 71-74 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Austin
Blair).
190. See Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv.
317,323-27 (1987) (discussing historical and cultural factors that produce unconscious racism).
191. 821 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1987).
192. Harris v. City of Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1987).
193. Id. at 500.
194. Id. at 500-04.
195. Id. at506.
196. Id. at 508.
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equal protection violation. The affirmative act was that of discriminating
against women. Although Harris was decided before DeShaney,197 the dis-
criminatory acts constituting the equal protection violation distinguish this
situation from the inaction of the social worker in DeShaney.
The successful § 1983 claim against the city presents an interesting
contrast to the potential outcome under §§ 1985 and 1986. Assuming that a
claim of a police conspiracy to engage in unconstitutional sexual harassment
is actionable under § 1985 based on animus against women as a class,'98 and
assuming a conspiracy among the police to at least tacitly authorize sexual
misconduct was provable, the city officials easily could have been held liable
under § 1986. They had provable knowledge of the pattern of sexual miscon-
duct, they had the power as officials to act preventively, and they failed to
take any remedial action."
Whether the case was litigated under § 1983 or §§ 1985 and 1986, how-
ever, the plaintiff would have confronted the difficulty of proving legal
responsibility for the passive response of eitherthe police orthe city officials.
In the face of massive complaints of acts ranging from rape to serious sexual
harassment of very young women,2' the moral culpability of both groups is
apparent: Neither had made meaningful attempts to deal with the ongoing
pattern of misconduct. Nonetheless, legal responsibility ordinarily attaches
only for misfeasance, and both §§ 1983 and 1985 require proof of affirmative
misconduct, though deliberate indifference or tacit encouragement sometimes
suffice to meet that standard.20'
By contrast, § 1986 makes one liable for culpable inaction. It renders
responsible those whose knowledge places them closest to the underlying
conspiracy, regardless of whether or not they acted affirmatively. In Harris,
claims under §§ 1985 and 1986 would have focused on the passivity of
the city officials in the face of the blameworthiness of the police. In contrast,
the plaintiffs' § 1983 action focused on the blameworthiness of the city
officials. The former is probably the more morally accurate construction of
the situation as well as a more straightforward approach to the 1871 Civil
197. See supra notes 36-42 (discussing criticism of limited governmental liability for
inaction).
198. See supra note 80 (discussing Supreme Court's unwillingness to decide if § 1985
protects women as class); cf supra note 81 (citing lower courts' findings that § 1985 claims
can properly be based on sex discrimination). I am unaware of any reported cases involving
§ 1985 sexual harassment issues.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69 (evaluating elements of § 1986 claim).
200. See Harris v. City of Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499, 500-04 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that
"extensive evidence of prior incidents of sexual misconduct" was presented at trial).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76 (discussing when liability can attach under
§ 1985 in absence of overt action to further conspiracy).
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Rights Act.2"2 The clarity and accuracy on both legal and moral levels of a
§ 1986 claim makes it a superior vehicle for claims against passive, knowl-
edgeable bystanders or onlookers faced with conspiracies animated by invidi-
ous motivation.
V Sections 1985 and 1986 Are a Constitutional Exercise of Congressional
Enforcement Power Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
As Part II of this Article describes, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 pursuant to the enforcement power granted it by the Enforcement
Clause, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 3 The Thirteenth Amendment
provides support and authority for §§ 1985 and 1986 as well,2" allowing
the statutes to address certain private as well as public acts. The Supreme
Court has upheld the constitutionality of § 1985(3) under the authority of
the Thirteenth Amendment, 5 although it has never addressed the constitu-
tionality of§ 1986. Lower courts, however, have declared the section consti-
tutional) 6
Until the 1996 Term of the Supreme Court, the constitutionality of these
statutes did not present a terribly difficult issue. With the decision in City of
Boerne v. Flores, however, the Court's newly devised test for the constitution-
ality of legislation passed under the authority of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment raises fresh questions concerning the scope of Section 5.207 The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, conceded that Congress has broad
202. Cf. ARENDT, supra note 113, at 247. Arendt quotes from the Israeli trial court'sjudg-
ment in the Eichmann case, referring to the criminal activities of the Nazi regime:
For these crimes were committed en masse... and the extent to which any one of
the many criminals was close to or remote from the actual killer of the victim means
nothing, as far as the measure of his responsibility is concerned. On the contrary,
in general the degree ofresponsibility increases as we draw further awayfrom the
man who uses the fatal instrument with his own hands.
Id.
203. See supra note 52 (discussing legislative history of Civil Rights Act of 1871).
204. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) (stating that § 1985 was proper
exercise of Congress's power to define "badges and incidents of slavery"). The Court in United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners ofAmerica, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,837 (1983),
declared that the "central concern" of § 1985(3) is to "[c]ombat the violent and other efforts of
the Klan and its allies to resist and to frustrate the intended effects of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments." See Douglas Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30
HARV. C.Rt-C.L. L. REv. 1, 15-32 (1995) (discussing evolution of Supreme Court's construc-
tion of Thirteenth Amendment).
205. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 96.
206. See, e.g., Robeson v. Fanelli, 94 F. Supp. 62,68 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (stating that § 1986
is constitutional to extent that § 1985 is constitutional).
207. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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power to define the scope of liability under the Fourteenth Amendment's
enforcement clause2 °" (and presumably, the enforcement clause of the Thir-
teenth Amendment as well) and that Congress may impose liability for con-
duct that is not necessarily unconstitutional.0 9 The Court also conceded that
limitations on the scope of congressional authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment do not pertain to remedial legislation that is "correc-
tive or preventive, not definitional."21 However, the Court required that
legislation employ means "proportionate to [the desired] ends." '' Such a
"congruence and proportionality," '212 according to the majority, ensures that
the statute does not work a substantive change in the meaning of the Constitu-
tion.213 Additionally, "[t]he appropriateness of remedial measures must be
considered in light of the evil presented., 214 This inquiry essentially involves
whether the evil inducing the legislation's passage presents or presented an
actual threat. This appears to be primarily an empirical inquiry. 5
Nowhere does the Court elaborate on the meaning of the "congruence
and proportionality" standard. Its purpose of protecting against congressional
overreaching is apparent, but it lacks referents in existing caselaw, rendering
it susceptible to a variety of interpretations. Notwithstanding the ambiguities,
however, one may ascertain certain likely meanings of the standards. First,
208. Id. at 2163 (stating that "§ 5 is apositive grant oflegislative power" and that Congress
may prohibit conduct which is not itself unconstitutional, if prohibiting that conduct would
"deter or remedy" constitutional violations).
209. Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
210. Id. at 2166; see id. at 2163-64. Thus, §§ 1985 and 1986 do not appear in any danger
of eradication. In Boerne, the Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act on the
ground that its enactment exceeded the authority of § 5, because it mandated a substantive
interpretation of the Constitution in cases in which a law of general applicability substantially
burdened a person's free exercise of religion. Id. at 2170-72. The majority opinion distin-
guished between such substantive pronouncements and "[l]egislation which deters or remedies
constitutional violations [that] fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if
in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional," and accords the latter
legitimacy. Id. at2163. Moreover, " [t]he constitutional propriety of [legislation adopted under
the Enforcement Clause] must bejudged with reference to the historical experience it reflects,"
particularly this country's long history of race discrimination. Id. at 2169.
211. Id. at2170-71.
212. Id. at 2171.
213. Id at2170.
214. Id. at 2169 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)).
215. Id. at2161 ("RFRA's legislative record lacks examples ofmodem instances ofgener-
ally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry. The history of persecution in this
country detailed in the hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years."). It is not
clear whether the Court is referring to threats existing at the time the statute was passed or
current threats. The more likely interpretation is that a reviewing court must consider condi-
tions at the time of the statute's passage.
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proportionality evidently relates means and ends, requiring an appropriate
balance between the seriousness of the legislative goal and the intrusiveness
and efficacy of the legislative means to accomplish that goal. The meaning
of congruence is less clear; presumably it refers to the relationship between
the class of potential defendants and the particular evil the legislation seeks
to eradicate. A statute would not be congruent with the legislative goal if it
held liable defendants who were too far removed from the core concerns of
the legislation and the Fourteenth Amendment or whose actions were too
peripheral to the central illegal activities.
Sections 1985 and 1986, construed together, fit within these constitu-
tional parameters. First, Congress passed the provisions to remedy Klan
depredations, directly intending to prevent and deter further violence.216
Rather than declare the meaning of the Constitution, the provisions enforce
the constitutional mandate of granting equal protection to African-Americans.
Because a § 1985 violation requires a class-based conspiracy to violate an
underlying, independently existing federal right, it reinforces the remedial
nature of these statutes.217 Breaking the argument into its component parts,
the Thirteenth Amendment requires elimination of the badges and incidents
of slavery and permits legislation directed against private individuals to
enforce the prohibition. Section 1985 accomplishes this by providing a
private right of action against conspirators. The Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires government to protect African-Ameri-
cans. Section 1986 enforces it by making government officials, private
officials, and even knowledgeable bystanders liable for failing to protect
against a racist conspiracy. Private liability is justified in part because it
reinforces the responsibility of government officials. It also makes rescue
efforts more effective. When private bystanders have an obligation to report
a conspiracy to government officials, the obligation of those officials to
respond intensifies.
Second, focusing in particular on § 1986, application ofthe proportional-
ity standard corroborates the conclusion ofconstitutionality. The dependence
of a § 1986 claim upon proof of the requisite underlying conspiracy ensures
that its application remains within narrow bounds.21 Moreover, the evil of
racist conspiracies justifies the reach of the statute. References to the histori-
cal conditions spawning the original legislation, as well as the continuing
216. See supra notes 47-62 (discussing legislative history of §§ 1985 and 1986).
217. See Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 376 (1979)
("Section 1985(3) ... creates no rights. It is a purely remedial statute, providing a civil cause
of action when some otherwise defined federal right-to equal protection of the laws or equal
privileges and immunities under the laws - is breached by a conspiracy in the manner defined
by the section.").
218. Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes 70-92 (discussing elementsof§ 1985 conspiracy).
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threat that racist conspiracies pose, militate in favor of its constitutionality.219
Considered in light ofthe Klan's insurrectionist violence and local lawenforce-
ment's indifference to the plight of the Klan's victims, § 1986 appears to be
an appropriate and proportional response.
The congruence of § 1986 with the statutory objectives is more disput-
.able. At its outer margins, § 1986 reaches defendants who have no personal
or vicarious liability under § 1985. Section 1986 demands only advance
knowledge of a § 1985 conspiracy, ability to prevent it, and failure to prevent
its occurrence. Thus, § 1986 draws within its ambit many whose liability
would rest purely on inaction - a failure to protect - and who would have no
special relationship to the individual plaintiffs or defendants. Particularly
with respect to private defendants, who have no power over conspirators, the
connection between inaction and the underlying racist conspiracy may be too
tenuous to warrant liability. In addition, liability creates only a second-order
incentive to prevent the execution of conspiracies, because private bystanders
can normally act preventively only by calling the police. By contrast, official
defendants such as police officers, bound by a general duty to protect the
public, appropriately should bear more responsibility than private bystanders.
Therefore, their situation presents less of a problem.
The constitutionality of applying § 1986 to private defendants can appear
particularly problematic if one accepts the negative, restrictive view of the
Constitution outlined earlier in this Article.2" That is, if the Constitution does
not impose strong, affirmative duties to protect, or if it does not permit statu-
torily created affirmative duties that overcome the problems of nonfeasance
and lack of direct state action, private defendants may be beyond the reach of
legislation passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement
clause. Notwithstanding this view, however, as Part VI of this Article ex-
plains, private individuals can legitimately and constitutionally be named as
defendants under § 1986. Under both a broader interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, as suggested herein, and under § 1986, the duty to protect
equally can require that private individuals report racist conspiracies to the
responsible public officials.
The seriousness of the historical and current threat of racist conspiracies
to the American community necessitates and justifies the extended remedies
219. Seesupra notes 47-51 (discussing extremeviolencethatpreceded passage of§ 1986).
The Boerne Court pointed out the necessity ofjudging the proportionality of legislation in the
context of the historical circumstances originating it, and specifically mentioned our national
history of racial discrimination. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2167 (1997)
(discussing "widespread and persistent deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from this
country's history of racial discrimination").
220. See supra text accompanying notes 33-42 (describing Court's narrow view that
Fourteenth Amendment mandates few affirmative obligations).
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of § 1986.2 In recent decades, the Supreme Court has adverted to the harm
racism causes its victims, with lower courts echoing the theme.' The courts'
recognition of this harm has by now become embedded in the fabric of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, because private individuals are expected
to act only with reasonable diligence to protect a conspiracy's targets, their
role and hence the extent of their liability is diminished. The focus of the
statute remains on the police and other officials with the authority and where-
withal to institute effective protective action. Thus, although § 1986 in part
reaches far beyond any constitutional duty, ' questions of its authority to do
so must be resolved in the context of its historical origins and ongoing condi-
tions. This Article supports the proposition thatthe remedies of§ 1986 do not
exceed the bounds of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
VI. The Affirmative Duties of§ 1986 Support Interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment as an Affirmative Mandate to Provide Effective
Protection to African-Americans, Undermining the Negative,
Restrictive View of Constitutional Duties
A. The Passage of§ 1986 Shortly After Enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment Makes It a Helpful Guide to Interpreting the
Nature of Constitutional Duties
Congress passed § 1986, as part of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, only three
years after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, pursuant to
the authority of the enforcement clauses of both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
221. See, e.g., United States v. Piche, 981 F.2d 706, 720 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding
conviction for racist conspiracy to kill Asians); United States v. Lane, 883 F.2d 1484, 1487
(10th Cir. 1989) (upholding convictions for murder of Jewish talk show host).
222. See supra text accompanying note 103; see also Fisher v. Shamburg, 624 F.2d 156,
162 (10th Cir. 1980) ("[A] racially motivated conspiracy to interfere with one's enjoyment of
a place of public accommodation constitutes a badge of slavery which is a deprivation of equal
privileges and immunities under 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3)."); United States v. Glass Menag-
erie, 702 F. Supp. 139, 142 (E.D. Ky. 1988) ("The 1940's and 1950's had many pleasant
nostalgic aspects, but the flagrant discrimination in public accommodations ... was not one of
them. It was a disgrace. It was an abomination of which we all should be ashamed. To permit
it to recur in any form or to any degree would be a regression in the evolution of our society.
Any such resurgence must be immediately and decisively eliminated whenever it occurs."); King
v. Greyhound Lines, 656 P.2d 349, 352 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) ("The chief harn resulting from
the practice of discrimination by establishments serving the general public is not the monetary
loss of a commercial transaction or the inconvenience of limited access but, rather, the greater
evil of unequal treatment, which is the injury to an individual's sense ofself-worth and personal
integrity.")
223. See infra text accompanying notes 259-61 (discussing courts' rejection of constitu-
tional duty to protect and rescue).
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Amendments. 4 As such, § 1986 evidences avirtually contemporaneous under-
standing of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement powers
and can shed light on its interpretation.' That is, the breadth of § 1986
indicates that the enacting Congress had an expansive view of its abilities to
impose obligations on local actors to counter racial violence. In turn, that
expansive view suggests that the current Supreme Court's interpretation of
Fourteenth Amendment obligations and enforcement may be too narrow. The
scope of § 1986 supports a conclusion contrary to the Court's current under-
standing.
Congress ratified the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865.6 Over the next
few years, it became evident that the abolition of slavery was not accomplish-
ing the desired goal of improving the lives of black citizens. 7 Vigilante
groups perpetrated outrageous acts of violence on former slaves and their
supporters who had dared to protest the resubjugation of African-American
citizens under an economic and social system frighteningly similar to
slavery.' Simultaneously, the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
was called into question and its authority challenged. 9 As a result, the
224. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
225. Eric Schnapper employs a similar method of comparing virtually contemporaneous
enactments to argue for a broad interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment: "Mhe framers
of the [Flourteenth [A]mendment cannot have intended it to nullify remedial legislation [such
as the Freedmen's Bureau Acts, providing specific relief to black citizens] of the sort Congress
simultaneously adopted." Schnapper, supra note 23, at 789.
226. See TENBROEK, supra note 21, at 156 (stating date of Thirteenth Amendment's
ratification).
227. See Amar, supra note 49, at 1216-17 (discussing lives of African-Americans after
enactment of Thirteenth Amendment).
228. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and
Civil Rights After the Civil War, in RACE, LAW AND AMEiCAN HISTORY 1700-1990: EMANCI-
PATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 377, 383 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992) (discussing attitudes of
opponents to Reconstruction Amendments). Kaczorowski has stated:
Former Confederates tenaciously adhered to a philosophy of State sovereignty and
refused to respect national authority. They defiantly resisted the emancipation
guaranteed blacks by the Thirteenth Amendment. Southern white supremacists
denied the freedmen's freedom by continuing to treat them as if they were slaves.
White supremacists frequently met the attempts of freed blacks to assert their
constitutionally guaranteed freedom with violentrepression and economic intimida-
tion. Moreover, they treated white Unionists and federal officers with disrespect,
and resorted to economic intimidation and violence toward them as well.
l
229. See NELSON, supra note 18, at 48 (summarizing debate over Act). Nelson has stated:
Democrats and occasional Republicans like John A. Bingham questioned the reach
of the new amendment, however, and President Andrew Johnson vetoed the pro-
posed act, in part, he contended, because the Constitution entrusted the protection
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Congress passing the Fourteenth Amendment realized that the renunciation of
slavery must be accompanied by meaningful protection of the fundamental
rights of African-Americans if the gains of the Civil War were to be re-
tained."0
This subpart sets forth the abolitionist interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment introduced at the beginning of this Article. The purpose in sum-
marizing that interpretation here is twofold: first, to suggest that the affirma-
tive duties of § 1986 provide further support for the interpretation, for which
a substantial body of evidence already exists; second, to situate my arguments
within an existing debate by identifying them with a particular interpretive
tradition. The evidence presented here points to fruitful avenues for further
study and deflates the claims of those endorsing a very negative, restrictive
view of constitutional rights.
Several decades ago, legal historians such as Jacobus tenBroek and
Howard Jay Graham argued convincingly that, in an attempt to provide clear
and expansive constitutional authority for affirmative federal remedies, the
drafters incorporated the language and the natural rights ideology of the
abolitionist movement into the Fourteenth Amendment." More recently,
Robin West has adopted historians' findings to ground an argument for a more
of civil rights to the states. Although the Republican proponents of the Civil Rights
Act mustered the necessary two-thirds vote to override the veto, some residual
doubt about the power of the federal government to protect civil rights nonetheless
remained. Taken together, the problems connected with the restoration of the South
to the Union and the protection of freedmen's rights called for yet another constitu-
tional amendment.
Id
230. See Kaczorowski, supranote228, at384 ("In 1806, thepolitical context of civil rights
deprivations compelled Congress to take effective measures to secure the fundamental rights
of American citizens."); Schnapper, supra note 23, at 788 ("Proponents of the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment repeatedly emphasized that one of its primary purposes was to place in the
[Constitution the principles of [S]ection I of the Civil Rights Act.").
231. See generally TENBROEK, supra note 21; Howard Jay Graham, The EarlyAntislavery
Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 479 [hereinafter Early Anti-
slavery Backgrounds]; Howard Jay Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7
STAN. L. REV. 3 (1954) [hereinafter Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment]. Also, Amar
has stated:
As modem day legal positivists, we tend to view the Bill [of Rights] as creating
or conferring legal rights. But the congressional resolution accompanying the Bill
explicitly described some of its provisions as 'declaratory.' To a nineteenth-century
believer in natural rights, the Bill was not simply an enactment of We the People
as the Sovereign Legislature bringing new legal rights into existence, but a declara-
tory judgment by We the People as the Sovereign High Court that certain natural
or fundamental rights already existed.
Amar, supra note 49, at 1206.
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expansive, contemporary reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 In addi-
tion, Steven Heyman has traced the origins of this natural rights ideology of
protection to classical legal tradition, and similarly demonstrated how the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated this broad understanding. 3
The understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers is significant
in that it provides necessary and useful guidance to present-day courts that
construe its clauses. Judges are not free to substitute their own preferred
interpretation of the Constitution for that ofthe framers. Rather, according to
Ronald Dworkin (and many other constitutional theorists), courts must adhere
to what the framers intended to say when drafting, for example, the Fourteenth
Amendment:
We must try to find language of our own that best captures... the
content of what the "framers" intendedto say.... History is crucial to that
project, because we must know something about the circumstances in
which a person spoke to have any good idea of what he meant to say in
speaking as he did."
And further: "We cannot capture a statesman's efforts to lay down a
general constitutional principle by attributing to him something neither he nor
we could recognize as a candidate for that role." 5 This principled limitation
on constitutional interpretation provides a link between the historical under-
standings I explore in this subpart and their significance for current interpreta-
232. See supra text accompanying notes 20-27 (discussing West's work).
233. See Heyman, supra note 23, at 546 (tracing Fourteenth Amendment to classical
theory). Heyman has stated:
Acentral purpose ofthe Fourteenth Amendment and Reconstruction legislationwas
to establish the right to protection as apart of the federal Constitution and laws, and
thus to require the states to protect the fundamental rights of all persons, black as
well as white. In establishing a federal right to protection, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was not creating a new right, but rather incorporating into the Constitution the
concept of protection as understood in the classical tradition. The debates in the
Thirty-Ninth Congress over the Fourteenth Amendment... confirm that the consti-
tutional right to protection was understood to include protection against private
violence.
Id.
234. RONALD DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONsTrUTION 8 (1996). Dworkin has stated:
We turn to history to answer the question of what they intended to say, not the
different question of what other intentions they had. We have no need to decide
what they expected to happen, or hoped would happen .... We are governed by
what our lawmakers said - by the principles they laid down - not by any informa-
tion we might have about how they themselves would have interpreted those
principles or applied them in concrete cases.
Id. at 10.
235. Id. at 9.
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tion of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. That the framers understood
the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating natural law conceptions of pro-
tection therefore sheds light on the appropriate modem application of the
Amendment.
For years, prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
abolitionists had employed the language of equal protection and due process
to develop and to advocate the notion of federal protection of natural rights3 6
Employing philosophical assumptions prevalent at the time, the abolitionist
movement conceived of these fundamental rights expansively to include
everything from procedural due process to the substantive rights to control of
one's body and family relations, the rights to contract and to own property, the
rights to freedom of speech and of religion, to travel, to earn a livelihood, and
to be protected from violence and from threats to survival.3 7 Government
protection from threats to the exercise of these rights was indispensable to
their exercise." The abolitionists' conception of equal protection and due
process emerged from this first principle and was closely linked to it:
Based on a state of nature in which all men were conceived to be equal,
supported by laws of nature and of God, which endowed all men equally
with certain indivestible rights, strengthened and carried forward by the
doctrine of the social compact, sanctioned by the starting point of their
political philosophy, namely Locke..., the notion that governments were
instituted to protect man in his inalienable rights to life, liberty, and prop-
erty and that the standard by which this protection was to be meted out was
that of equality. 39
It was thus a basic function of government to ensure the rights of all, which
were violated equally by direct governmental violation of rights, or by private
violations against which the government failed to protect.24 The distinction
between misfeasance and nonfeasance was not relevant in this context. The
language of equal protection of the laws reflected this conception, as did the
abolitionist notion of due process. Although due process had a strong proce-
236. See generally TENBROEK, supra note 21.
237. Id. at 42-56 (describing abolitionists' interpretation of fundamental rights).
238. See id. at 169. tenBroek has stated:
[L]iberty or civil liberty is what one gets in society as a result of governmental
restraint on the conduct of others. Without such governmental restraint, that is,
without such laws or their enforcement, there is no civil liberty. Hence the absence
of laws is a denial or withholding of the protection which was the reason for
creating or entering civil society.
Id.
239. Id. at 96.
240. See id. at 97-98 (stating that violations of equal protection may result from both
private and public conduct); see also Early Antislavery Backgrounds, supra note 23 1, at 659
(describing obligations of federal government under abolitionist theory).
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dural component, many abolitionists employed a substantive usage as well.24
Moreover, "due process was viewed not merely as a restraint on governmental
power but as an obligation imposed upon government to supply protection
against private action."'242
Further, according to this interpretation, Congress adopted the locutions
of the abolitionists in drafting the Fourteenth Amendment with its protection
of the rights to due process and equal protection. Congress conceived both
notions broadly to encompass full governmental protection of natural rights. 3
"Due process" and "equal protection" were often considered overlapping
concepts, each reinforcing the other in the command to protect black citizens.
Sometimes they even were used interchangeably.2" The strong view of equal
protection was held not only by proponents of the amendment but by many
opponents as well, who believed that this clause empowered Congress "to
legislate upon all matters pertaining to the life, liberty, and property of all the
inhabitants of the several states."24 The amendment, in effect, revolutionized
notions of federalism by granting Congress the power to protect the natural
rights of black citizens in Section 5, the Enforcement Clause.246
After 1868, violence in the South perpetrated by the Klan and other
vigilante groups only intensified, necessitating Congressional actionto enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment.247 Section 1986, with its duty to protect, formed
241. See TENBROEK, supra note 21, at 100 (describing substantive development of due
process); Heyman, supra note 23, at 557-63 (relating history of Due Process Clause).
242. See TENBROEK, supra note 21, at 99.
243. See id. at 192-93. tenBroek has stated:
The congressional debates over the Fourteenth Amendment reemphasize the "full"
or "equal" protection of men in their natural or civil rights- by the national Consti-
tution and legislature- as the predominant element in section I .... Their central,
almost exclusive concern was, on the part of the proponents, with the national
protection of persons or citizens in their natural rights; and, on the part of antago-
nists, with the destructive impact of this notion upon the federal system.
Id; see NELSON, supra note 18, at 64 ("[P]roponents of section one [ofthe Fourteenth Amend-
ment], most of them veterans of the antislavery movement, referred to the same libertarian and
egalitarian principles that they had commonly used during the three previous decades."); Kaczo-
rowski, supra note 228, at 387 ("The framers... were unequivocal in declaring that the natural
rights to life, liberty, and property, and rights incidental to these, were the rights of U.S. citizen-
ship that they intended to secure with the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.").
244. See TENBROEK, supra note 21, at 194-95, 199, 222-23 (describing connections
between "equal protection" and "due process").
245. Id. at 195 (quoting Rep. Robert S. Hale, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., IstSess. 1063-64
(1866)).
246. See id. at 196-99, 204-07, 209, 224 (discussing effect of Enforcement Clause);
Kaczorowski, supra note 228, at 379.
247. See FONER, supra note 50, at 425 ("In its pervasive impact and multiplicity of
purposes, however, the wave of counterrevolutionary terror that swept over large parts of the
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an integral part of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. Its inclusion indicates the view
of that Congress that providing effective protection to those covered by the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments can require unusually assertive
action. It is difficult to believe that the Congress drafting and passing the bill
pursuant to the authority conferred by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments was unaware of the possibility of exceeding constitutional boundaries
when seeking effective protection against conspiracies. Its willingness to pass
the legislation evidences its awareness that § 1986 does not exceed permissi-
ble limits and does comport with the underlying constitutional authority. That
constitutional authority must be sufficiently broad to encompass liability for
a failure to protect in appropriate instances. The abolitionist interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment is consistent with the apparent understanding of
the Forty-Second Congress that enacted the 1871 Civil Rights Act.248
B. The Affirmative Understanding of Constitutional Duties Under the
Fourteenth Amendment Vitiates the Negative View of Constitutional Duties
Which Recognizes a Duty to Protect in Only the Narrowest of
Circumstances and Would Support a Broader View of Such Duties
As introduced in the beginning of this Article, the current predominating
view of the Constitution interprets it as primarily protecting individual liberty
and, as a corollary, ensuring governmental noninterference in all but a narrow
range of situations.249 This view has led to the Supreme Court's refusal to
recognize constitutional duties to rescue or to protect in all but extremely
narrow circumstances.20 Those duties that do exist derive from the Due
Process Clause, and have been adopted almost wholesale from tort law, which
South between 1868 and 1871 lacks a counterpart either in the American experience or in that
of the other Western Hemisphere societies that abolished slavery in the nineteenth century.");
see also ia at 425-26, 454-55 (discussing influence of Klan violence on movement for Four-
teenth Amendment).
248. Cf. Schnapper, supra note 23, at 791. Schnapper has stated:
It is inconceivable that the majority of [the 39th] Congress, by approving the
[Fourteenth] [A]mendment, intended to condemn their most important domestic
program or to embody in the Constitution the social theories of their opponents.
The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment may have applied explicitly only to the states, but
supporters of the amendment clearly believed that the principle of equality embod-
ied in it was entirely consistent with the Freedmen's Bureau legislation [which
required the federal government to provide affirmative protection to black citizens
in the South].
Id.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 30-35 (stating this opinion).
250. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198 (1989)
(stating that "in certain limited circumstances [only] the Constitution imposes upon the State
affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular individuals").
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shares the assumption that it is not the function of the law to enforce an
obligation to rescue or to protect no matter how severe the injury to the victim
or how simply the rescue could be accomplished." The twin assumptions
that the law should not enforce duties to protect and that the scope of constitu-
tional duties is delimited by those imported from the common law should be
reexamined. The narrow view of constitutional duties in particular is under-
mined by the contrary existence of workable and fully justified affirmative
duties such as those of § 1986, supported by a broader interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's clear pronouncements about the particu-
lar evils of racism and other conduct subject to heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause could provide the final support tipping the balance
in favor of recognizing constitutional duties to protect against racist conduct
in particular.5 2
Alternatively, even if sufficient support for an additional constitutional
duty to protect does not exist, the extreme, negative view of constitutional
duties is undermined by the evidence presented. At the very least, the view
of the DeShaney Court that the Due Process Clause is merely "a limitation on
the State's power to act, not... a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety
and security" 3 is demonstrably erroneous. Onthe contrary, the clauses ofthe
Fourteenth Amendment were understood by the framers as imposing duties on
government to protect the natural rights of citizens to life, liberty, and prop-
erty.Z
4
This subpart of the Article first summarizes the existing tort and constitu-
tional law regarding duties to protect. I compare these limited duties to those
of § 1986: The former focus on narrowly defined individual relationships,
such as the custodial relationships between ajailer and a prisoner, that serve
as a basis for imposing a duty of care; the latter affirmative duty of care of
§ 1986 focuses on the severe harm plaintiffs who are not protected from racist
conspiracies suffer. I complete the contrast between the two notions by
setting forth a hypothetical due process/equal protection-based duty to protect
against racist conduct modeled on § 1986. I compare its potential application
251. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(1965) ("The fact that the actor realizes
or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action."); W. PAGE KEETON ET" AL., PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984) (concluding that "[tihe law has
persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation of common humanity to go to
the aid of another human being who is in danger").
252. It is not my intent in this Article to define the exact parameters of such a duty. Rather,
I wish to argue that the Court's current construction of protection duties is too narrow.
253. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
254. See supratext accompanying notes 231-46 (discussing rights that Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects).
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to that of the existing constitutional rule. The comparison reveals that, in the
case of racist conduct, the existing constitutional rule does not adequately
provide protection to victims of racism. The broader view of the Fourteenth
Amendment outlined in this article would support, and perhaps even mandate,
a much more comprehensive duty to rescue in these cases.
The common law of torts has sought to distinguish between malfeasance
and nonfeasance, holding that no tort duty exists when injury occurs because
of nonfeasance. 5 However, several exceptions exist. The first category of
affirmative duty arises where a special relationship exists between the defen-
dant and the perpetrator that may require the defendant to control the perpetra-
tor's behavior and gives rise to a defendant's duty to protect the victim. 6
Such a duty also arises when a special relationship exists between the defen-
dant and the victim whom the defendant failed to protect. 7 Second, a defen-
dant may have a duty to protect when the defendant has participated in creat-
ing or exacerbating the danger to which the victim is subjected." s
Likewise, in constitutional civil rights law no general duty to protect
exists, but the exceptions delineated above sometimes can be successfully
255. See KEETONETAL., supra note 251, at 373-75 (describing differences in liability for
malfeasance and nonfeasance).
256. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS, supra note 251, at § 315(a) (imposing duty
when "special relation exists between the [defendant] and the [perpetrator]").
257. See id. § 315(b) (imposing duty when "special relation exists between the [defendant]
and the [victim] which gives to the other a right to protection"). Courts may define "special
relationship" narrowly to cover only custodial relationships (such as prison guard/prisoner), see
Graham v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 22 F.3d 991 (10th Cir. 1994), or more broadly to
cover therapists' relationships with certain patients, see Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976). The special relationship doctrine can be troublesome in
application and can render irrational results, viz:
[A]ssume that several children stretch a wire across the road in order to injure an
unsuspecting bicyclist in their neighborhood. A bystander (not acquainted with the
children or their bicycling victim) who could prevent the serious injury simply by
shouting a warning has no legal obligation to do so. However, if one of the chil-
dren who is devising the trap tells her therapist her plans to injure the victim, the
therapist will have a duty to protect the bicyclist from the client, even though
meeting the obligation may not be easy and may involve significant costs to the
therapeutic relationship.
Adler, supra note 101, at 876. Because in some jurisdictions a therapist's relationship with a
patient gives rise to a duty to protect identified targets of the patient's threats of violence, the
therapist would have a duty to warn the victim of the danger here, but the bystander, who is in
a much better position to prevent the violence at little or no cost to herself, is not obliged to do
anything.
258. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS, supra note251, at §§ 321-22 (imposing duty
to act when prior conduct causes another's peril). As avariation on this principle, if a defendant
has undertaken a rescue, then he or she may be liable for failing adequately to follow through.
See id. § 323 (imposing duty to act when prior conduct increases another's peril).
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invoked to create a due process-based constitutional duty. 9 Police miscon-
duct cases, which comprise a large percentage of the reported cases under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, provide one class of examples. Under the common-law public
duty doctrine, police have a duty to protect only the public at large, an abstract
entity, rather than a particular individual. And the notion of limited federal
constitutional obligations also supports imposing only narrow constitutional
duties on individual officers or police officials.2" Federal courts frequently
have called upon some variant or combination of these doctrines to explain
their rejection of a constitutional duty to protect or to rescue in the absence
of a special relationship or a state-created danger.
261
The existing exceptions focus on the individual relationship between the
defendant and either the perpetrator or the victim, whereas § 1986 by its terms
and at the margins creates a rule of almost pure bystander liability. Its under-
lying assumption in this respect is that of the abolitionist interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause - that the law must ensure equivalent protection to
both black and white citizens to protect the relatively less powerful from
private violent conspiracies. The harm from violent, racist conspiracies so
undermines the opportunities for blacks to participate as full citizens that it
warrants an affirmative burden on society and its members.262 In other words,
the Court's current notion of constitutional duties to protect privileges the
freedom of unrelated defendants (whether individuals or institutions), whereas
the broader view of § 1986 and its supporting constitutional interpretation
privilege those wounded by a harm the Court considers uniquely grievous.
A Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection-based duty
to protect263 authorized by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and mod-
eled on § 1986 could accord with the broader view I have elaborated here. It
could incorporate the knowledge, ability, and intent elements of § 1986, so
259. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197-200
(1989) (outlining circumstances under which due process-based duties attach to private con-
duct).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33 (describing federal duties under Constitu-
tion).
261. See, e.g., Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1446 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[N]othing in the
Constitution requires governmental units to act when members of the general public are
imperiled .... In our opinion, the Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the
[government] to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to
provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order.") (citations
omitted); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[A] mere failure to
rescue is not tortiousjust because the defendant is a public officer whose official duties include
aiding people in distress.").
262. Seesupratext accompanying notes 12-14,103,193 (listing examples ofhate crimes).
263. The hypothetical duty would be limited to cases involving racist and other class-based
conduct protected by heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
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that a potential defendant first must have knowledge of the impending harm.
A defendant additionally would need to have the ability to act preventively.
The defendant, however, would only have to act with reasonable diligence.
Thus, a private member of a racist organization need not singlehandedly
confront a perpetrator or intervene in an altercation and could not be liable for
the failure to do so. This individual would only have to take reasonable
action - generally, make a phone call or alert the police to the situation.2
The third element requires at least negligence in the failure to commit a
preventive act;' strict liability is precluded. Last, as with § 1986, the re-
quirement that a wrongful act occur would ensure that liability relates to
harmful events rather than to merely speculative conversation.
The hypothetical duty that I outline here, based on both the Due Process
and the Equal Protection Clauses, could be limited to an underlying Thirteenth
or Fourteenth Amendment violation in order to parallel § 1986. Thejustifica-
tions for the duty to protect of § 1986 are based on its efficacy in minimizing
racist conduct. Any new duty to protect would be supported by similar
reasons if it was also directed at limiting similar conduct.2"
A broader duty to protect of this nature, at least with respect to racist
conduct, does not create the irrational distinctions that result from the current
rule. The following example from John Adler captures the arbitrary bound-
aries of the current tort law categories:
[I]magine several adults standing near a child about to step into the path of
a truck. Each could easily protect the child, without inconvenience or
significant risk. One of the adults is the child's babysitter who has done
264. This requirement corresponds to the duty of easy rescue proposed by a number of
commentators. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 101. Thebystanders in Clarkv. Clabaugh could
have been liable under § 1986 for failing to urge earlier police involvement in the riot. See
supra text accompanying notes 1-25. On the other hand, an individual unable for some reason
to make a phone call or otherwise contact appropriate authorities or to warn the victims could
not be held liable for the consequences of the constitutional violation.
265. See Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1297 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994) (describing police
officer's alleged violation of § 1986).
266. A constitutional duty to protect of this nature could extend only to harms defined
elsewhere in the Constitution, specifically to violations of the Equal Protection Clause that
involve heightened scrutiny or to Thirteenth Amendment violations involving members of
protected groups. Accordingly, harms intentionally directed at members of groups protected by
the Equal Protection Clause and thus violating it, as well as Thirteenth Amendment violations
directed at the same populations, could trigger a duty to protect on knowledgeable third parties.
The following examples illustrate how such a duty could work: First, a knowledgeable
fellow police officer would have a duty to prevent another officer's racially motivated beating
ofa prisoner. Second, a public employee in a managerial position would have to take steps to
prevent the demotion of a colleague based on her immediate supervisor's antisemitic attitudes.
Finally, a public housing building manager would have a duty to protect aprospective Hispanic
tenant from the housing authority's discriminatory refusal to rent an apartment to the applicant.
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everything reasonably possible prior to the appearance of the truck to keep
the child from harm's way, but for whatever reason, fails to restrain the
child as the child steps into the path of the truck. The second adult, who
also fails to restrain the child, realizes she is partially responsible for the
truck's lack of control, having hit the truck with her car, through no fault
of her own, only an instant before. A third adult leaps in front of the child
to wave off the truck. However, seeing that the truck is out of control, she
jumps back to protect herself and fails to take reasonable steps to restrain
the child. Finally, the fourth passive adult (the one in the best position to
restrain the child) is a "pure" bystander.
267
The first three individuals have a duty to protect the child based on first, a
special relationship; second, the creation of danger; and third, undertaking a
rescue. The fourth individual, however, has no legal obligation whatsoever.
This irrational result is a disincentive to those in the best position to provide
assistance in these situations, 26 although it does protect the absolute freedom
of those with no relationship to the victim.
Transposing this example into a constitutional context renders similar
results: The example can be reproduced with each of the adults as a police
officer. The first officer has temporary custody of the child sufficient to
create a special relationship.269 The second officer created the danger by
hitting the truck with her police cruiser.27 The third officer must act reason-
267. Adler, supra note 101, at 874.
268. Adler gives another example of the irrationality of the current rules:
Assume that there are two competing restaurants in the same neighborhood.
Both are aware of crime statistics in the neighborhood and can foresee that at some
point there will be violence in their parking lots. One establishment chooses to
ignore the threat; the other hires a security guard. Ultimately, customers are hurt
and bring separate actions against the restaurants. The restaurant that ignored the
threat successfully moves to have the case against it dismissed. On the other hand,
the restaurant that hired a security guard is found to have a duty based upon its
undertaking to protect its customers and faces a jury determination about the
reasonableness of its conduct
Id. at 884. Avoidance of safety measures is the obvious incentive that a legal rule that requires
volunteers not to act negligently but does not sanction a total failure to provide protection
creates.
269. See generally, e.g., Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that
special relationship and consequent duty to protect exist when state agency assumes guardian-
ship of child and returns child to inadequate foster placement); Cornelius v. Town of Highland
Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (1 Ith Cir. 1989) (reversing summaryjudgment because special relationship
could exist when prison inmates on work-release abducted town clerk); Lewis v. Neal, 905 F.
Supp. 228 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding special relationship and duty to protect exist when state
agency assumes guardianship of child and returns child to inadequate foster placement).
270. See generally, e.g., Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing sum-
maryjudgment because duty based on state-created dangertheory could existwhen officers left
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ably in carrying out an undertaken task,27 but the fourth officer likely can
stand by and watch the child die with impunity, a consequence even more
disturbing than when only private individuals are involved.272
intoxicated woman to walk home alone after her husband had left her in their care; woman later
suffered severe brain damage after falling down embankment on way home); Dwares v. City of
New York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993) (evaluating protester's claim under § 1983 and Due
Process Clause arising from officers' conduct in assuring skinheads that they could beat up pro-
testers and flag burners with relative impunity and without intervention, thus increasing danger
to plaintiff); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1990) (evaluating claim that police
chief, who was close friend of plaintiff's decedent's husband, interfered with enforcement of
protective order, allowing husband to kill wife); Ross v. City of Waukegan, 910 F.2d 1422 (7th
Cir. 1990) (evaluating civil rights claim brought under state-created danger theory when
plaintiff's decedent drowned after sheriffprevented rescue by lifeguards, firefighters, and police
officer based on intergovernmental agreement requiring county to provide all rescue services);
Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989) (evaluating claim that police officer intention-
ally left arrestee in custody of private citizen, who continued interrogation and killed plaintiff's
decedent); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) (evaluating claim that state-created
danger existed when police left passenger in impounded car alone in unsafe neighborhood and
she subsequently was raped); Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987)
(evaluating claim of state-created danger after inmate posing as police officer driving patrol car
that officers loaned killed plaintiffs decedent); Davis v. Fulton County, 884 F. Supp. 1245
(E.D. Ark. 1995) (findingthatdeputy sheriff owed duty to protect plaintiffwhen deputy directed
pretrial detainee to unload police car parked behind plaintiff s store).
271. See, e.g., Jackson v. Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 1983). The Jackson
court stated:
[I]f you do begin to rescue someone you must complete the rescue in a nonnegli-
gent fashion even though you had no duty of rescue in the first place .... The
rationale is that other potential rescuers (if any) will be less likely to assist if they
see that someone is already at the scene giving aid.
Id.
272. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussingDeShaney). Seegenerally,
e.g., Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that superintendent of state
school for disabled has no duty to protect student from ongoing sexual assaults by other
students notwithstanding knowledge of assaults); Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir.
1995) (finding no duty to protect or warn plaintiff of release from jail of abusive former boy-
friend despite police assurances to mother of his continued incarceration; boyfriend subse-
quently killed plaintiffs children); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding no
duty to inebriated passengers of car left behind when police arrested driver); Gregory v. City
of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1992) (same); Losinski v. County ofTrempealeau, 946 F.2d
544 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding no police duty to protect plaintiffs decedent from shooting by her
abusive husband, even though deputy sheriff accompanied victim to retrieve her belongings);
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding
no special relationship between school and students requiring school to protect students from
student-on-student sexual assault); Andrews v. Wilkins, 934 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(finding no state-created danger when police prevented private rescue of fleeing suspect);
Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding no basis for due process claim on
behalf of family of children killed in fire during firefighter strike when police, pursuant to
general order, refused striking firefighters access to local firehouse); Jackson v. City of Joliet,
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Although the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 1986 do not
address this situation directly because no invidious discrimination is involved,
the result could be different under the hypothetical expanded duty if the truck
driver were about to run down the child because of the child's race, even
though the bystander and child have no relationship, no underlying conspiracy
is involved, and the bystander harbors no invidious racial motivation in failing
to protect the child. (The hypothetical duty to protect would reach more
broadly than § 1986 to encompass not just conspiracies, but all manner of
racist conduct.)
By contrast, the existing narrow constitutional rule of DeShaney cannot
adequately address racist conduct because it focuses exclusively on the some-
what unusual circumstances of custodial relationships.273 It stands in stark
contrast to the vigorous enforcement mechanism that a broader view of the
Fourteenth Amendment could support. The implications of§ 1986 include its
endorsement of a broader view of permissible duties to protect authorized by
the Fourteenth Amendment. And finally, even if the hypothetical duty is not
supportable, the broader, affirmative view of the Fourteenth Amendment
outlined here vitiates the cramped view of constitutional duties that the
DeShaney Court set forth.
C. Section 1986 and a More Affirmative Interpretation of Constitutional
Duties Suggest a Broader Affirmative Action Remedy Than the
Supreme Court Currently Permits
The Supreme Court's current interpretation of the permissible scope of
affirmative action plans under the Equal Protection Clause is exceedingly
narrow. As elaborated inAdarand, previously discussed in this Article, race-
based affirmative action plans are subject to the strictest scrutiny.274 The
Court has expressed concern for individuals adversely affected by a program's
use of racial criteria in decisionmaking.275 Thus, "the means chosen [must] fit
[the] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.u
276
715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that police had no duty to assist passengers in burning
car); Rogers v. City of Port Huron, 833 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (finding no basis for
constitutional wrongful death claim when police left unconscious and inebriated individual
lying by side of road); Franklin v. City of Boise, 806 F. Supp. 879 (D. Idaho 1992) (finding no
due process duty to rescue fleeing suspect from drowning).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 249-52.
274. See Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24 (1995) (describing framework for
constitutional analysis of race-based classifications).
275. See id. at 224 (naming "consistency" as primary value of Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence).
276. Id. at 226 (quoting City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
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According to the Court, the necessary fit between means and ends can exist
only when a plan remedies specific acts of past discrimination occurring
within the jurisdiction of the program's proponent.' The remedy of affirma-
tive action then becomes a sort of quid pro quo for past identifiable acts. In
the absence of such specific, discoverable acts, no racial preferences can
operate even in the face of large racial disparities in the workforce and unde-
niable broadscale discrimination from multiple sources causing the disparities.
The affirmative approach of § 1986, with its implications for interpreta-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause, and the abolitionist interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause address the issue of affirmative action from a very
different perspective. Initially, the workforce racial disparities and the pres-
ence of widespread societal racism lingering since slavery ended could invoke
a governmental duty to protect, to ensure that African-Americans are pro-
tected from ongoing racism and its effects on the ability to earn a livelihood.
Under the abolitionist approach, the government could be obligated to provide
an effective remedy to those affected by discriminatory practices. Therefore,
not only would affirmative action be permissible, it could be required to
remedy an unacceptable situation in certain instances.27 In addition, a close
fit between the perpetrators of illegal deeds and those who bear the brunt of
affirmative action efforts -white workers who would have obtained jobs or
promotions but for the program - is not invariably necessary under the affir-
mative approach. Similar to § 1986, which inducts knowledgeable though
otherwise "innocent" bystanders into reasonable protective action, an appro-
priate affirmative action plan in effect may require white job applicants, akin
to bystanders, to step aside in favor of black applicants disadvantaged by
diffuse prior acts of discrimination.
While not every affirmative action plan would pass constitutional muster
under a broader approach, many more such efforts would survive constitu-
tional scrutiny than is currently the case. Where precisely to draw the line is
beyond the scope of this Article, as resolution of the question presents a
number of issues tangential to the main thrust of this piece. I mean merely to
suggest here that the approach I have elaborated has relevance to the affirma-
tive action debate and that the Court's current understanding of affirmative
action is too narrow.279
277. See id. at 220-22 (describing requirements of valid race-based classification).
278. See WEST, supra note 20, at 25-26 (discussing abolitionists' view that government
must take affirmative step to create "equal protection under the law").
279. See Schnapper, supra note 23, at 753 (describing Supreme Court jurisprudence of
race as "devoid of any reference to the original intent of the framers of the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment'). Schnapper stated:
From the closing days of the Civil War until the end of civilian Reconstruction
some five years later, Congress adopted a series of social welfare programs whose
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VII. Conclusion
This Article demonstrates that although little-used, § 1986 plays an
important function in American civil rights law and ought not to be over-
looked. On a practical level, it implicates defendants who can play an effec-
tive part in deterring racist conspiracies. Police and public officials whose
prior knowledge of a conspiracy places them in a position to prevent its conse-
quences are drawn into protective action, as are bystanders who knew about
the conspiracy. Section 1986 is a constitutional measure to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment under Section 5 of that Amendment. Historically, § 1986
illustrates that, notwithstanding the current dominant interpretation of the
Constitution, our legal tradition does contain strongly affirmative duties
enacted to counter particularly extreme evils such as those perpetrated by the
Ku Klux Klan.
That historical fact provides further support for the abolitionist interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under that interpretation, government
and even certain private actors have an affirmative obligation to protect
African-Americans, so that inaction constituting a failure to protect in appro-
priate instances can trigger liability. This broad interpretation of Fourteenth
Amendment duties contrasts sharply with the narrowly conceived duty to
protect of DeShaney and its progeny. Evidence for the existence of a broader
duty, in part conferred by § 1986, undermines the DeShaney rationale. More-
over, the abolitionist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, as exem-
plified by § 1986, can vitiate the Supreme Court's current position on the
constitutionality of affirmative action programs and reaffirms that the Equal
Protection Clause is much more than a guarantee of color-blindness in the
creation and administration of government-sponsored programs. Finally, the
affirrnative interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that I begin to outline
in this Article forcefully challenges the currently popular negative view of the
Constitution and indicates that the negative argument is not the final word in
the debate.
benefits were expressly limited to blacks. These programs... were adopted over
repeatedly expressed objections that such racially exclusive measures were unfair
to whites. The race-conscious Reconstruction programs were enacted concurrently
with the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and were supported by the same legislators
who favored the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. This history strongly
suggests that the framers of the amendment could not have intended it generally to
prohibit affirmative action for blacks or other disadvantaged groups.
Id. at 754.
